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INTRODUCTION 
NE of the most hotly debated questions under the common 
law is under what circumstances an individual has a duty to 
disclose relevant information unknown to the person with whom 
she bargains. Dozens of law review articles and treatises and over 
one thousand cases explore this vexing question of when and what 
a contracting party must disclose to her counterparty, even in the 
absence of explicit misleading statements. Although one frequently 
encounters statements that, absent a fiduciary or confidential rela-
tionship, an individual need never disclose all that she knows to her 
bargaining partner, this is best understood as mere rhetoric by 
courts, rather than an accurate statement of law.1 Even a cursory 
 
1 See, e.g., 3 Arthur Linton Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 608 (1960) (“Statements 
are exceedingly common, both in texts and in court opinions, that relief will not be 
given on the ground of mistake unless the mistake is ‘mutual.’ Such a broad generali-
zation is misleading and untrue.”); Anthony T. Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure, Infor-
mation, and the Law of Contracts, 7 J. Legal Stud. 1, 6 (1978) (“In the past, it was of-
ten asserted that, absent fraud or misrepresentation, a unilateral mistake never 
justifies excusing the mistaken party from his duty to perform or pay damages. This is 
certainly no longer the law, and Corbin has demonstrated that in all probability it 
never was.”); see also Heritage Ins. Co. of Am. v. First Nat’l Bank of Cicero, 629 F. 
Supp. 1412, 1415 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (“[N]o duty of disclosure exists absent a fiduciary 
duty or public trust between parties to a transaction.”); French v. Vining, 102 Mass. 
132, 135 (1869) (“It is sometimes rather loosely said that mere silence, on the part of 
O 
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examination of the cases reveals, instead, that courts require full 
disclosure in some circumstances, but not in others. 
Determining what circumstances will lead courts to intervene to 
correct disparities in knowledge between bargaining parties, how-
ever, has proved problematic. Courts repeatedly reach divergent 
results in similar, or even seemingly identical, cases and have failed 
to articulate a coherent or generally accepted rule as to when they 
will impose a duty of candor on contracting parties. 
As a result, numerous legal commentators have analyzed the law 
of fraudulent silence (also referred to as actionable nondisclosure 
or actionable silence) in an attempt to identify some guiding prin-
ciple that will rationalize the cases and generate accurate predic-
tions of how courts will rule. Although some commentators point 
to various specific factors (for example, whether the withheld in-
formation related to a latent defect or whether the litigating parties 
were in a confidential or fiduciary relationship) that courts con-
sider either alone or in some combination, others conclude that 
courts provide no useful rule of law.2 Still other legal scholars, most 
notably Professors Anthony Kronman and Kim Lane Scheppele, 
reject the notion that narrow doctrinal rules motivate fraudulent 
silence decisions and instead advance meta-theories3 (based, re-
 
the vendor, as to a known defect, does not amount to a fraud. But this is far from be-
ing universally true.”). 
2 See George Spencer Bower, The Law Relating to Actionable Nondisclosure and 
Other Breaches of Duty in Relations of Confidence and Influence, at vi (1915) (argu-
ing that the law of actionable nondisclosure cannot be “fit . . . into the rigid frame-
work of a code”), quoted in Kim Lane Scheppele, Legal Secrets: Equality and Effi-
ciency in the Common Law 112 (1988); Paula J. Dalley, The Law of Deceit, 1790–
1860: Continuity Amidst Change, 39 Am. J. Legal Hist. 405, 407 (1995) [hereinafter 
Dalley, Law of Deceit] (discussing the law of fraud, including the law of fraudulent 
silence, and noting that “there does not seem to be any factor which accurately pre-
dicts which policy a particular court will find determinative in a particular case, other 
than the merits of the case”); Deborah A. DeMott, Do You Have the Right to Re-
main Silent?: Duties of Disclosure in Business Transactions, 19 Del. J. Corp. L. 65, 66 
(1994) (“My thesis is that legal doctrine does not resolve these scenarios in a symmet-
rical fashion.”). 
3 We use the terms “theories” and “meta-theories” somewhat loosely. Some have 
suggested to us that, technically speaking, the field lacks a comprehensive theory to 
explain fraudulent silence case outcomes. Furthermore, they argue, the explanations 
posited by commentators such as Professors Kronman and Scheppele should be 
viewed as half descriptive and half normative. For these reasons, they argue, we 
should not take them seriously as theories that generate testable predictions. While 
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spectively, on whether courts seek primarily to further economic 
efficiency or fairness) in an attempt to untangle the cases and illu-
minate the law of fraudulent silence.4 
These meta-theories—along with the famous United States Su-
preme Court case of Laidlaw v. Organ5—inspired this project. In 
Laidlaw, Organ had been bargaining over the price of 111 hogs-
heads of tobacco with Laidlaw’s agent, Girault, on the evening of 
February 18, 1815, but did not reach an agreement on price before 
departing. During the night, three gentlemen who had been with 
the British fleet came ashore with news that the Treaty of Ghent 
had been signed, ending the war of 1812 and lifting the blockade of 
the port of New Orleans. One of these men was the brother of Or-
gan’s business partner (who had a one-third interest in the profits 
of the tobacco) and informed Organ of the news during the night. 
Although the news of the war’s end was to be published in a 
handbill early the next morning, Organ returned to Girault before 
 
we somewhat agree with this characterization of the explanations (one of us more 
than the other), in fact many take these explanations seriously. See, e.g., Richard 
Craswell, Instrumental Theories of Compensation: A Survey, 40 San Diego L. Rev. 
1135, 1165–66 n.38 (2003) (citing Professors Kronman and Scheppele as providing dif-
ferent theories regarding information disclosure); William Hubbard, Communicating 
Entitlements: Property and the Internet, 22 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 401, 416 n.89 (2004) 
(citing the work of Professors Scheppele and Kronman to support the claim that 
scholars disagree about the optimal level of disclosure). For those readers who believe 
we are using the term “meta-theories” too loosely, we suggest viewing this study as 
the first systematic test of the conventional wisdom that flows from the commenta-
tors’ claims. Given our reading of the claims made by Professors Kronman, Schep-
pele, and others, however, we characterize the explanations as (albeit imperfect) 
“meta-theories” in the sense that they posit frameworks designed to organize the 
“data” produced by the court. 
4 See, e.g., Scheppele, supra note 2, at 119–24 (advocating an equality of access ap-
proach to explain the law of actionable nondisclosure); Kim Lane Scheppele, “It’s 
Just Not Right”: The Ethics of Insider Trading, 56 Law & Contemp. Probs. 123, 125 
(1993) (same); Kronman, supra note 1, at 13–15 (arguing that the law of actionable 
nondisclosure is best explained by the law’s desire to reward those who have ex-
pended time and effort to acquire the undisclosed information); Alan Strudler, Moral 
Complexity in the Law of Nondisclosure, 45 UCLA L. Rev. 337, 338–39 (1997) (argu-
ing that the law of actionable nondisclosure as applied to buyers is best explained 
through a deontological philosophy); Alan Strudler & Eric W. Orts, Moral Principle 
in the Law of Insider Trading, 78 Tex. L. Rev. 375, 408–09 (1999) (justifying insider 
trading regulation on a deontological theory of “equitable disclosure”). 
5 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 178 (1817). 
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its release and purchased the tobacco without disclosing the news.6 
A few hours later, the news was released and the price of tobacco 
rose significantly. 
Chief Justice Marshall ruled that Organ had no duty to disclose 
his knowledge of the end of the war to Girault.7 Due to the brevity 
of Marshall’s opinion, however, commentators have struggled to 
identify the principle underlying the decision. In the process, sev-
eral theories have emerged that purport to explain not only the 
Court’s decision in Laidlaw, but also the large and seemingly in-
consistent body of other fraudulent silence cases. 
Unfortunately, many authors in the field of fraudulent silence 
discuss a limited number of cases that they believe support their as-
serted theories, without providing evidence that the chosen cases 
are representative and without distinguishing cases that do not 
support their theory.8 This Article represents the first attempt to 
study empirically the factors that cause courts to impose disclosure 
duties on bargaining parties in some circumstances, but not in oth-
ers.9 We analyze data coded from 466 decisions spanning a wide ar-
ray of jurisdictions and covering over two hundred years. 
The results are mixed. In some instances our data support the 
conventional wisdom relating to common-law disclosure duties. 
For example, we find that courts are more likely to require the dis-
closure of latent, as opposed to patent, defects and are more likely 
to require disclosure when the parties are in a fiduciary or confi-
dential relationship. 
In other instances, our results cast doubt on much of the conven-
tional wisdom regarding the law of fraudulent silence. First, al-
 
6 Id. at 179, 182–83. Apparently, Girault asked Organ “if there was any news which 
was calculated to enhance the price or value of the article about to be purchased.” Id. 
at 183. The lower court determined that there was no evidence that Organ’s reply 
“suggested any thing to the said Girault, calculated to impose upon him with respect 
to said news,” and directed the jury to find for Organ. Id. at 183–84. 
7 Id. at 195. Marshall did, however, remand to the lower court for a jury determina-
tion regarding Organ’s response to Girault’s inquiry. Id. 
8 See Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 31–32 
(2002) (criticizing the methodology of much legal empirical research). 
9 One prior attempt to study the cases systematically is Dalley, Law of Deceit, supra 
note 2. Although Professor Dalley’s study is not a statistical analysis of the cases, her 
article is an important contribution to the literature and her findings are discussed 
throughout this Article. 
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though it is generally understood that courts have become more 
likely to impose disclosure duties over time, we find that courts ac-
tually have become less likely over time to impose duties to dis-
close. Second, and perhaps most importantly, we find that courts 
are no more likely to impose disclosure duties when the informa-
tion is casually acquired as opposed to deliberately acquired, and 
that unequal access to information by the contracting parties is not 
a significant factor that drives courts to find a duty to disclose. We 
do find, however, that when both factors are present courts are sig-
nificantly more likely to force disclosure. 
I. COLLECTION OF HYPOTHESES AND CONSTRUCTED  
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
 We examined twenty independent variables and their relation-
ships to courts’ decisions to impose a duty to disclose in fraudulent 
silence cases. We grouped the variables into five general classes: 
the type of information that was undisclosed, the type of transac-
tion in which the parties were engaged, how the undisclosed infor-
mation was acquired, the characteristics of the uninformed party, 
and the behavior of the informed party. We also analyzed the case 
decision year and the geographic region and jurisdiction of the 
court deciding the case. 
A. The Type of Information 
Commentators frequently assert that the imposition of disclo-
sure duties depends on the type of information in question. In par-
ticular, they claim that courts are more likely to find that an in-
formed party owes to the uninformed party a duty to disclose when 
the information is intrinsic in nature, relates to personal intentions 
or opinions, relates to latent defects, concerns a defect likely to 
cause bodily injury or property damage, or would have updated or 
corrected previously disclosed information. 
1. The Information Was Intrinsic, as Opposed to Extrinsic or 
Market, Information 
Some commentators argue that courts distinguish between in-
trinsic facts, which relate directly to the subject matter of the trans-
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action, and extrinsic facts, which relate to the market conditions or 
environment affecting the subject matter of the transaction, and 
only require the disclosure of intrinsic facts.10 Joseph Story explains 
the distinction as follows: 
Intrinsic circumstances are properly those which belong to the 
nature, character, condition, title, safety, use, or enjoyment, &c., 
of the subject-matter of the contract, such as natural or artificial 
defects in the subject-matter. Extrinsic circumstances are prop-
erly those which are accidentally connected with it, or rather 
bear upon it at the time of the contract, and may enhance or di-
minish its value or price, or operate as a motive to make or de-
cline the contract; such as facts respecting the occurrence of 
peace or war, the rise or fall of markets, the character of the 
neighborhood, the increase or diminution of duties, or the like 
circumstances.11 
To illustrate, in the previously discussed case of Laidlaw v. Or-
gan, Chief Justice Marshall ruled that “the intelligence of extrinsic 
circumstances, which might influence the price of the commodity, 
and which was exclusively within the knowledge of the vendee,” 
need not be disclosed to the vendor.12 In Laidlaw, the information 
concerning the end of the War of 1812 and the consequent lifting 
of the blockade of the port of New Orleans was extrinsic informa-
tion because it did not pertain to conditions solely affecting the to-
bacco exchanged between Organ and Laidlaw, but instead per-
tained to conditions affecting the market for and price of all 
tobacco being shipped from New Orleans. Accordingly, it could be 
 
10 See 2 James Kent, Commentaries on American Law 377 (Legal Classics Library 
1986) (1827) (“There may be some difference in the facility with which the rule [of 
disclosure] applies between facts and circumstances that are intrinsic, and form mate-
rial ingredients of the contract, and those that are extrinsic, and form no component 
part of it, though they create inducements to enter into the contract, or affect the 
price of the article.”); R.J. Pothier, Treatise on the Contract of Sale, ¶ 242, at 147–48 
(L.S. Cushing trans., Legal Classics Library 1988) (1839) (“[T]here is no doubt, 
that . . . a buyer is not entitled to complain, that the seller has not informed him of cir-
cumstances extrinsic to the thing sold, however much he may be interested in know-
ing them.”); 1 Joseph Story, Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence § 300, at 301–02 
(W. H. Lyon, Jr. ed., Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 14th ed. 1918) (1834). 
11 1 Story, supra note 10, § 300, at 301–02 (footnote omitted). 
12 Laidlaw, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) at 195 (emphasis added). 
2ND SUB_KRAWIECZEILERBOOK.DOC 11/17/2005  10:32:28 AM 
1802 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 91:1795 
argued that Chief Justice Marshall permitted nondisclosure in that 
case because the undisclosed information was an extrinsic fact. If it 
had been an intrinsic fact, according to this theory, disclosure 
would have been required. 
Other commentators, however, argue that the intrinsic/extrinsic 
distinction provides, at best, only a partial explanation. Although 
disclosure has been required more often with respect to intrinsic, 
rather than extrinsic, facts, the better explanation for such rulings, 
argue some scholars, is that intrinsic facts may not be readily dis-
coverable by the uninformed party, whereas extrinsic facts are,13 or 
that extrinsic facts are normally the result of a deliberate search, 
whereas intrinsic facts are often casually acquired.14 In addition, 
scholars argue that the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction cannot ade-
quately explain the results in all of the cases, particularly those 
where the uninformed party is the purchaser, as opposed to the 
seller.15 Finally, some observers argue that the intrinsic/extrinsic 
distinction has been replaced in modern jurisprudence with other 
theories of disclosure duties and is no longer relevant to court deci-
sions concerning the degree of candor required of contracting par-
ties.16 We thus predicted that in earlier years courts would be more 
likely to rule that a duty to disclose existed in cases involving in-
trinsic information, but that this effect would narrow in significance 
over time and finally disappear altogether. 
2. The Undisclosed Information Concerned Personal Intentions or 
Opinions 
Although the distinction between opinion and fact is not always 
clear, commentators seem to agree that failure to disclose personal 
opinions or intentions is not actionable.17 This rule is sometimes re-
 
13 See Scheppele, supra note 2, at 128–29; W. Page Keeton, Fraud—Concealment 
and Non-Disclosure, 15 Tex. L. Rev. 1, 21 (1936). 
14 See Kronman, supra note 1, at 17–18 (arguing that market information is typically, 
though not always, acquired through deliberate search). 
15 See Keeton, supra note 13, at 21. 
16 See Scheppele, supra note 2, at 128–29. 
17 See, e.g., Morton J. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law, 1780–1860, at 
263 (1977) (stating that misstatements of opinion were not actionable at common law, 
the rationale being to prevent judicial incursion into the private bargaining process); 
see also Dalley, Law of Deceit, supra note 2, at 409 (listing reasons for the rule that 
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ferred to as a distinction between personal and general informa-
tion, or between individual and common facts.18 Gulian Verplanck 
illustrates the distinction as follows: A director of a large insurance 
company believes, from his observations and knowledge of the in-
surance industry and his own institution, that the insurance busi-
ness is “overdone” and that current premiums are an inadequate 
compensation for the risks assumed by insurers.19 If he sells his in-
surance stock to a purchaser with less knowledge of the industry 
than he, the director is under no duty to disclose his opinion (with 
which other informed parties might reasonably disagree) that the 
stock is overpriced.20 If, on the other hand, the undisclosed infor-
mation concerns losses in the insurance company that have de-
pleted half its capital (a verifiable fact), disclosure would be re-
quired.21 
 
statements of opinion are not actionable, including difficulties of proof and the fact 
that such statements were too common to be reasonably relied on), 418–19 (arguing 
that statements of intention are not actionable). A long-standing exception to this rule 
exists: Under the doctrine of promissory fraud, a party commits fraud by entering into 
a contract without disclosing that she lacks a present intention to perform on the con-
tract. See, e.g., Lazar v. Superior Court, 909 P.2d 981, 985 (Cal. 1996) (“‘Promissory 
fraud’ is a subspecies of the action for fraud and deceit. A promise to do something 
necessarily implies the intention to perform; hence, where a promise is made without 
such intention, there is an implied misrepresentation of fact that may be actionable 
fraud.”); Paiva v. Vanech Heights Constr. Co., 271 A.2d 69, 71 (Conn. 1970) (“Al-
though the general rule is that a misrepresentation must relate to an existing or past 
fact, there are exceptions to this rule, one of which is that a promise to do an act in the 
future, when coupled with a present intent not to fulfil [sic] the promise, is a false rep-
resentation.”); Beers v. Atlas Assurance Co., 253 N.W. 584, 587 (Wis. 1934) (“While 
there is a division of opinion, the weight of authority sustains a broader rule to the 
effect that fraud may be predicated upon a promise made with a present intention not 
to perform the same.”). 
18 See, e.g., Gulian C. Verplanck, An Essay on the Doctrine of Contracts: Being An 
Inquiry How Contracts Are Affected in Law and Morals by Concealment, Error, or 
Inadequate Price 119–20 (Arno Press 1972) (1825) (distinguishing individual and 
common facts); Paula J. Dalley, From Horse Trading to Insider Trading: The Histori-
cal Antecedents of the Insider Trading Debate, 39 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1289, 1327–
29 (1998) [hereinafter Dalley, Insider Trading] (distinguishing general and personal 
information). 
19 Verplanck, supra note 18, at 121. 
20 Id. at 121–22. 
21 Id. at 122. Verplanck’s hypothetical also could be explained on the grounds that 
courts distinguish between intrinsic and extrinsic facts, or that the parties lack equal 
access to information regarding the lost capital, whereas information regarding the 
general state of the insurance industry is theoretically available to everyone. Similarly, 
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Although we predicted that courts are less likely to find that the 
informed party owed the uninformed party a duty to disclose when 
the withheld information related to a personal opinion or inten-
tion, we also predicted that such cases were relatively rare, given 
the widespread agreement among commentators that such infor-
mation is not required to be disclosed. In addition, as regards alle-
gations of a failure to disclose personal opinions, there is a second 
reason to predict that these sorts of cases are rare. Because most 
opinions are founded on underlying facts, we predicted that well-
pleaded suits generally allege fraudulent nondisclosure of these 
facts, rather than of the opinion itself. In other words, because 
plaintiffs (or, more accurately, their counsel) should plead those 
claims that have some chance of success, we predicted that rela-
tively few cases alleging a failure to disclose a personal opinion 
would be present in our dataset. Instead, plaintiffs intent on in-
creasing their chances of success should plead a failure to disclose 
the underlying facts on which the opinion was based. 
3. The Undisclosed Information Related to a Latent Defect 
One of the most common theories employed by commentators 
to explain the results in nondisclosure cases concerns the difference 
between latent and patent defects. As with so many of our vari-
ables, commentators seem to agree that there is a greater duty to 
disclose latent, as opposed to patent, defects, but they disagree as 
to the rationale for the distinction.22 
In order to distinguish the concept of latent defect from that of 
unequal access to information, we employ the term “latent defect” 
 
Professor Paula Dalley illustrates the common-law rule regarding the disclosure of 
personal intentions through the example of a horse trade. Dalley, Insider Trading, su-
pra note 18, at 1328. In her example, the fact that the horse seller plans to leave town 
shortly and is therefore willing to accept any price for the horse is personal informa-
tion that need not be disclosed. Id. 
22 Compare, e.g., Kronman, supra note 1, at 22–25 (arguing that requiring sellers to 
disclose latent—but not patent—defects is an economically efficient policy because 
sellers typically acquire information regarding latent defects casually and because re-
quiring the disclosure of obvious defects increases transaction costs), with Scheppele, 
supra note 2, at 134–38 (arguing that the distinction between latent and patent defects 
is best justified on the grounds that latent defects are typically inaccessible to one of 
the parties—generally the buyer). 
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narrowly in this Article, as a term of art. Accordingly, as defined 
here, only property (including slaves) can be subject to a latent de-
fect—the term does not apply to all undisclosed and difficult-to-
access information.23 For example, an undisclosed illness or injury 
affecting a person would not qualify as a latent defect in an appli-
cation for insurance or employment, but would constitute a latent 
defect in the sale of a slave.24 Similarly, in a stock transaction, the 
fact that the issuer is about to become the subject of a takeover 
bid, thus raising the stock price significantly, would not be consid-
ered a “defect,” although the information is certainly relevant to 
the transaction and would greatly affect the purchase price. Consis-
tent with the assertions of legal scholars, we predicted that courts 
are more likely to impose disclosure duties when the withheld in-
formation relates to a latent defect. 
4. The Information Concerned a Defect Likely to Cause Bodily 
Injury or Property Damage 
It has been argued that the law traditionally has taken a stricter 
view with regard to information that, if disclosed, could prevent the 
occurrence of bodily injury or property damage, as opposed to in-
formation that, if disclosed, would avoid mere economic loss.25 The 
distinction seems defensible from an economic standpoint, as there 
may be circumstances when it would be inefficient for the law to 
correct an economic loss of one party (such as in some circum-
stances when the informed party has expended time and effort to 
acquire the information). The same efficiency argument cannot be 
 
23 See infra notes 59–60 and accompanying text (discussing fraudulent silence in 
slave sales). 
24 Compare Smith v. Rowzee, 10 Ky. (3 A.K. Marsh.) 527, 531 (1821) (sale of dis-
eased slave coded as latent defect), and Huntington v. Brown, 17 La. Ann. 48, 49 
(1865) (same), with Leclerc v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 39 A.2d 763, 764 (1944) (ill-
ness in applicant for insurance not coded as latent defect). In both cases, however, in-
formation regarding the undisclosed injury or illness might be accessible to only one 
party, meaning that the parties had unequal access to the information. 
25 See Keeton, supra note 13, at 14–17, 36. Apparently, this reasoning dates back at 
least to the time of St. Thomas Aquinas, who argued that vendors should be required 
to reveal defects in the good sold if “the defect is of such a nature that it may cause 
some damage to the buyer.” Pothier, supra note 10, ¶ 238, at 144 (criticizing Aqui-
nas’s restrictive view of disclosure duties). 
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made generally with regard to the prevention of bodily injury or 
property damage. 
For example, in older cases, some courts required the disclosure 
of information concerning the presence of small pox or other dan-
gerous germs, which, if known by the uninformed party, could have 
prevented the contraction and spread of the disease.26 Modern ex-
amples may include the duty of tobacco companies to disclose the 
health risks associated with cigarette smoking27 and the duty of 
sellers of real property to disclose the presence of asbestos or lead 
paint.28 Because this rule seems sensible from a policy perspective 
 
26 See, e.g., Huset v. J.I. Case Threshing Mach. Co., 120 F. 865, 865 (8th Cir. 1903) 
(“A manufacturer or vendor, who, without giving notice of its character or qualities, 
supplies or delivers to another a machine or article which, at the time of delivery, he 
knows to be imminently dangerous to the life or limbs of any one who may use it for 
the purpose for which it is intended, is liable to any one who sustains injury from its 
dangerous condition, whether he has any contractual relations with him or not.”); 
Leech v. Husbands, 152 A. 729, 733 (Del. Super. Ct. 1930) (holding that the landlord’s 
failure to disclose that a residence was “infested with vermin, bugs and disease germs” 
constituted fraud, although the tenant waived his right to relief by failing to sue within 
a reasonable time after discovering the defect); Cowen v. Sunderland, 14 N.E. 117, 
118 (Mass. 1887) ( “It has thus been held that where one lets premises infected with 
the small-pox, and injury occurred thereby, he was liable if, knowing this danger, he 
omitted to inform the lessee.”). 
27 Congress probably preempted any state common-law duties of cigarette manufac-
turers to disclose the health risks associated with smoking tobacco with the Federal 
Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1965, as amended by the Public Health 
Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331–1340 (2000). Together, these 
statutes provide that, “[n]o requirement or prohibition based on smoking and health 
shall be imposed under State law with respect to the advertising or promotion of any 
cigarettes the packages of which are labeled in conformity with the provisions of this 
chapter.” Id. § 1334(b). The Supreme Court has held that these statutes preempt state 
law claims based on a failure to disclose material health risks to consumers through 
advertising or promotion. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 524 (1992). 
In theory, claims based on a failure to disclose through other channels the health risks 
associated with smoking are not preempted. Cf. Burton v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 
884 F. Supp. 1515, 1521 & n.4 (D. Kan. 1995) (refusing to dismiss plaintiff’s fraud 
claim alleging that “the defendants knew that use of their products caused cancer and 
vasculatory disease, yet willfully chose to conceal those facts from the public” and 
noting that “it is possible that plaintiff can assert viable claims” of fraud at trial). 
28 See Kezer v. Mark Stimson Assocs., 742 A.2d 898, 903 (Me. 1999) (applying a 
Maine law that requires the disclosure of the existence of all hazardous materials in-
cluding asbestos and lead-based paint); Stanley J. Levy, Asbestos and the Real Estate 
Industry: The Legacy of the Magic Mineral, in The Impact of Asbestos on Real Estate 
7, 29–30 (1989) (stating that the dangerous qualities of asbestos may create a duty to 
disclose its known existence). But see Justice v. Anderson County, 955 S.W.2d 613, 
617 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997) (finding that the purchasers of a school building were not 
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and can be traced back at least to the fourteenth century, we pre-
dicted that, when the failure to disclose information is likely to 
cause physical injury or property damage, courts are more likely to 
rule that a duty to disclose exists. 
5. The Information Would Have Updated or Corrected Previously 
Disclosed Information29 
A duty to correct may arise if a statement is false when made 
even if the speaker believes the information to be correct. If the 
speaker subsequently discovers that the information earlier dis-
closed was false, he may have a duty to correct that information. 
By contrast, a duty to update may arise in some instances if a 
statement is correct when made, but later developments subse-
quently render the statement incorrect or misleading.30 The Re-
 
entitled to rescind the sales contract on the grounds that the property’s vendors—the 
county and school district—fraudulently concealed the presence of asbestos in the 
building, when the building was purchased “as is” at a public auction, the transaction 
was arm’s length, there was no fiduciary relationship between the parties, and the 
presence of asbestos was reasonably discoverable by purchasers). 
29 Although many courts and commentators discussing the common law of nondis-
closure do not distinguish between the duty to update and the duty to correct, federal 
courts and commentators applying or discussing the federal securities laws consider 
the distinction important, particularly as not all courts recognize a duty to update un-
der the federal securities laws. See Donald C. Langevoort, Half-Truths: Protecting 
Mistaken Inferences by Investors and Others, 52 Stan. L. Rev. 87, 118 (1999) (noting 
that the Second and Third Circuits recognize a duty to update “forward looking” in-
formation under some circumstances). 
 The court in Oran v. Stafford explained the distinction between the duty to update 
and the duty to correct well: 
The duty to correct exists “when a company makes a historical statement that, 
at the time made, the company believed to be true, but as revealed by subse-
quently discovered information actually was not.” . . . . 
 The duty to update, in contrast, “concerns statements that, although reason-
able at the time made, become misleading when viewed in the context of subse-
quent events.” 
Oran v. Stafford, 226 F.3d 275, 286 (2000) (quoting In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. 
Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1431 (3d Cir. 1997) (citations omitted)). 
 We coded the duty to update and the duty to correct together, rather than sepa-
rately, due to the difficulty of distinguishing one from the other, particularly in cases 
where the court did not distinguish between the two or confused the two issues. 
30 See Edward H. Wilson, Concealment or Silence as a Form of Fraud, and the Re-
lief or Redress Afforded Therefor, Both in Law and in Equity, 5 The Counsellor 230, 
236 (1895) (“Where one party has made a material representation which is true at the 
time, but which subsequently, to his knowledge, but not the knowledge of the other, 
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statement (Second) of Torts recognizes both a duty to correct and 
a duty to update, by stating that a party to a business transaction is 
under an obligation to disclose “subsequently acquired information 
that he knows will make untrue or misleading a previous represen-
tation that when made was true or believed to be so.”31 We pre-
dicted that cases involving information that would have updated or 
corrected previously disclosed information are more likely to result 
in a finding that the informed party owed the uninformed party a 
duty to disclose. 
B. The Type of Transaction 
Commentators also have asserted that the degree of required 
disclosure depends on the type of transaction in question. In par-
ticular, they have asserted that courts require heightened disclo-
sure in the cases of transactions between parties in a confidential or 
fiduciary relationship; transactions concerning the acquisition of 
insurance, surety, or a release from liability; transactions in which 
the parties have unequal access to information; transactions con-
cerning the transfer of real property; and transactions concerning 
the sale or transfer of a slave. 
1. A Transaction Between Parties in a Confidential or Fiduciary 
Relationship 
The most commonly asserted basis for the imposition of a duty 
to disclose material information is the presence of a fiduciary or 
confidential relationship between the parties to the transaction.32 
Technically, confidential relationships (or “relationships of trust 
and confidence” as they are typically labeled) differ from fiduciary 
 
becomes, through the alteration of circumstances, untrue, it is his imperative duty to 
communicate to the other information of the change in affairs.”). 
31 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 551(2)(c) (1976). 
32 See, e.g., 1 Story, supra note 10, § 308, at 305; see also Bay Colony, Ltd. v. Trend-
maker, Inc., 121 F.3d 998, 1004 (5th Cir. 1997) (stating that Texas law recognizes a 
duty to disclose which supports an action for fraud by nondisclosure only where a fi-
duciary or confidential relationship exists); Banque Arabe et Internationale 
D’Investissement v. Md. Nat’l. Bank, 57 F.3d 146, 155 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that an 
affirmative duty to disclose arises from the need to complete a partial statement or 
from a fiduciary or confidential relationship between the parties). 
2ND SUB_KRAWIECZEILERBOOK.DOC 11/17/2005  10:32:28 AM 
2005] Disclosure Duties and the Sin of Omission 1809 
relationships in that a fiduciary relationship arises out of the posi-
tion of the parties relative to each other, while a confidential rela-
tionship arises from the conduct of the parties or from the nature 
of the transaction that is the subject of the dispute.33 For purposes 
of this Article, however, the distinction is irrelevant. We hypothe-
size that both types of relationships lead to greater disclosure re-
quirements than do arms-length relationships, and accordingly, we 
make no attempt to distinguish fiduciary relationships from those 
that are merely confidential. 
Unfortunately, although the fiduciary character of some rela-
tionships is clear—such as principal and agent, corporate officer or 
director and shareholder, or trustee and beneficiary—the fiduciary 
or confidential nature of other relationships is not so clear, or 
might vary from state to state or across the time frame of our 
study.34 In fact, courts have purposely failed to provide an exhaus-
tive list of fiduciary relationships, preferring instead loose stan-
dards that allow judges to consider the specific facts of each case.35 
In order to avoid the difficulties and subjective decisions that could 
lead to errors in coding such cases, we adopted bright-line rules 
 
33 For example, the relationship between two family members may or may not be 
confidential depending on factors such as whether they typically entrust confidential 
information to one another or whether they enjoy a congenial relationship. In con-
trast, because of the status of a trust manager as a fiduciary to the trust beneficiary, 
the trust manager owes the trust beneficiary a fiduciary duty that cannot be dimin-
ished through daily interactions that suggest the relationship is not one of trust and 
confidence. See George Gleason Bogert, Confidential Relations and Unenforcible 
Express Trusts, 13 Cornell L.Q. 237, 248 (1928) (discussing the difference between 
confidential and fiduciary relationships); Richard W. Painter, Kimberly D. Krawiec, 
& Cynthia A. Williams, Don’t Ask, Just Tell: Insider Trading after United States v. 
O’Hagan, 84 Va. L. Rev. 153, 176–77 nn.101–03 (1998) (same).  
34 A common (but not exhaustive) list of recognized fiduciaries would include the 
following: executors, guardians, trustees, attorneys, and, to an extent, corporate direc-
tors and senior executives. See John C. Coffee, Jr., From Tort to Crime: Some Reflec-
tions on the Criminalization of Fiduciary Breaches and the Problematic Line Between 
Law and Ethics, 19 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 117, 150 (1981). 
35 Id. (“The common law has in fact always defined the term [fiduciary] with delib-
erate imprecision . . . .”); see also Harper v. Adametz, 113 A.2d. 136, 139 (Conn. 1955) 
(stating that the court has purposefully refrained from defining a fiduciary relation-
ship in precise detail that would exclude new situations); Karen E. Boxx, The Durable 
Power of Attorney’s Place in the Family of Fiduciary Relationships, 36 Ga. L. Rev. 1, 
15 (2001) (“A clear characterization of fiduciary obligation is elusive and its exact na-
ture is much debated.”). 
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that suit the purposes of our study but might not technically con-
form to the law. 
For example, the traditional common-law rule was that corpo-
rate officers and directors owed fiduciary duties only to the corpo-
ration itself, or to the shareholders as a unit, and not to the indi-
vidual shareholders of the corporation.36 Accordingly, courts often 
ruled that officers and directors could trade with shareholders 
based on material non-public information without disclosing such 
information.37 On the other hand, some courts, often invoking the 
“special facts” doctrine, refused to permit such transactions by cor-
porate officers and directors without full disclosure.38 Because fidu-
ciary obligations to individual shareholders were not recognized at 
this time, some commentators have used these cases as evidence 
 
36 Allen v. Curtis, 26 Conn. 456, 461 (1857) (“[T]he directors of the bank are the 
agents of the bank. The bank is the only principal, and there is no such trust for, or 
relation to, a stockholder as has been claimed by the plaintiff.”); Bd. of Comm’rs of 
Tippecanoe County v. Reynolds, 44 Ind. 509, 513–16 (1873) (stating that directors 
owe the shareholders as a unit a fiduciary duty when dealing with the corporation’s 
business or property, but that no such duty is owed by an officer or director to an in-
dividual shareholder when transacting for the purchase or sale of stock in the corpora-
tion); Smith v. Hurd, 53 Mass. (12 Met.) 371, 384 (1847) (“There is no legal privity, 
relation, or immediate connexion, between the holders of shares in a bank, in their 
individual capacity, on the one side, and the directors of the bank on the other. The 
directors are not the bailees, the factors, agents or trustees of such individual stock-
holders.”). 
37 Freeman v. Decio, 584 F.2d 186, 191 (7th Cir. 1978) (“Absent fraud, the tradi-
tional common law approach has been to permit officers and directors of corporations 
to trade in their corporation’s securities free from liability to other traders for failing 
to disclose inside information.”); Adams v. Mid-West Chevrolet Corp., 179 P.2d 147, 
156 (Okla. 1946) (“The general rule is that officers and directors . . . cannot deal with 
the property of the corporation for their own personal benefit or advantage. But this 
duty does not extend to the outstanding stock of the corporation for the reason that 
such stock is the individual property of the respective stockholders and not in any 
sense the corporation’s property.”). 
38 Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419, 431 (1909) (“That the defendant was a director of 
the corporation is but one of the facts upon which the liability is asserted, the exis-
tence of all the others in addition making such a combination as rendered it the plain 
duty of the defendant to speak.”). Those other facts included that Repide owned sev-
enty-five percent of the stock of the company, was administrator general of the com-
pany, was the chief negotiator for the company in talks that eventually led to the sale 
of all of the company’s property, and was in reality acting as an agent for all of the 
other shareholders in such negotiations. Id. at 431–32; see also Freeman, 584 F.2d at 
191 (“A few jurisdictions now require disclosure where certain ‘special facts’ exist, 
and some even impose a strict fiduciary duty on the insider vis-à-vis the selling share-
holder.”). 
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that courts apply an equality of access doctrine to determine when 
disclosure will be required.39 
We believe, however, that such cases are better understood as a 
precursor to today’s doctrine of officer and director fiduciary du-
ties rather than as evidence of a broad insistence by courts that 
parties to transactions have equal access to information. We thus 
coded these cases as fiduciary duty cases (as well as unequal access 
cases in most instances), despite the fact that the court might not 
have invoked this rationale and might even have specifically re-
jected it. 
Similarly, whether some relationships are confidential in nature 
varies from state to state or with the specific circumstances of the 
relationship. An examination of the law governing marital relations 
helps to illustrate the point. Some states consider marriage an in-
herently fiduciary relationship while others hold that marital rela-
tions might or might not be confidential, depending on the circum-
stances.40 Some states hold that a fiduciary or confidential 
relationship automatically begins with engagement while others do 
not.41 Courts also differ in the extent to which they treat married 
but separated persons as parties to a confidential or fiduciary rela-
tionship.42 
 
39 See, e.g., Strong, 213 U.S. at 433–34 (holding that agents of Repide, the chief 
shareholder, and the director of the Philippine Sugar Estates Development Company 
should have disclosed to prospective sellers of the company’s shares that they were 
acting on behalf of Repide, who was also the company’s chief negotiator for a U.S. 
government contract); Scheppele, supra note 2, at 113–14 (arguing that the Court’s 
ruling in Strong is explainable on equal access grounds, and not on fiduciary duty 
grounds, because the court explicitly rejected the proposition that corporate directors 
owe shareholders special disclosure obligations). 
40 Compare, e.g., United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 568 (2d Cir. 1991) (noting 
that marriage is not per se a fiduciary relationship), with DeLorean v. DeLorean, 511 
A.2d 1257, 1262 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1986) (noting that marriage is a fiduciary 
relationship). 
41 Compare, e.g., In re Marriage of Sokolowski, 597 N.E.2d 675, 680 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1992) (noting that a confidential relationship begins at engagement under Illinois 
law), and Lightman v. Magid, 394 S.W.2d 151, 156 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1965) (noting that 
a confidential relationship ordinarily exists at engagement), with Handley v. Handley, 
248 P.2d 59, 62 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1952) (holding that the presumption of a confiden-
tial relationship did not exist prior to marriage). 
42 Compare, e.g., Harroff v. Harroff, 398 S.E.2d 340, 343 (N.C. Ct. App. 1990) (hold-
ing that married persons owe each other fiduciary duties while negotiating a separa-
tion agreement), with In re Marriage of Auble, 866 P.2d 1239, 1244 (Or. Ct. App. 
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To avoid the daunting task of mastering the intricacies of the law 
of confidential relations in all fifty states, as well as the necessity of 
subjective judgment calls concerning whether the circumstances of 
a particular relationship make it confidential, we adopted bright-
line rules that reflected the weight of authority and applied them 
across all jurisdictions. For example, we treated engaged persons 
negotiating a prenuptial agreement as parties to a confidential rela-
tionship in all 50 states, despite the fact that this is not the law in all 
jurisdictions under all circumstances. This bright-line approach did 
not trouble us, given our hypothesis that, despite asserted differ-
ences across jurisdictions in the law of confidential relations, as a 
general matter, courts impose a heavier disclosure obligation in 
cases where the relation between the parties could be considered 
fiduciary or confidential, such as a familial or marital relationship, 
than they do when the parties share a merely arms-length relation-
ship. We thus predicted a significant, positive relationship between 
the likelihood of the court imposing disclosure duties and the exis-
tence of a fiduciary or confidential relationship. 
2. The Transaction Concerned Insurance, Surety, or a Release from 
Liability 
Professor W. Page Keeton described this theory best: “In re-
leases, in contracts of insurance, and in contracts of suretyship, 
practically all facts affecting the matter must be disclosed.”43 The 
most commonly asserted rationale for this rule, particularly as re-
gards insurance, is that the insured likely has knowledge affecting 
the contract that is unavailable to the insurance underwriter.44 
 
1993) (holding that married persons living apart may not owe each other fiduciary du-
ties in the negotiation of a separation agreement). 
43 Keeton, supra note 13, at 36; Wilson, supra note 30, at 231. But see Scheppele, su-
pra note 2, at 147–48 (arguing that when the insurer and insured have equal access to 
information, disclosure is not required). 
44 Scheppele, supra note 2, at 146–48; Verplanck, supra note 18, at 37–38 (“The in-
sured being the party from whom, in most cases, the underwriter obtains the special 
facts upon which the calculation of the risk is settled . . . . Every fact within his knowl-
edge, regarding which ignorance or mistake might possibly induce the underwriter to 
compute his risk upon an incorrect basis . . . is considered in law as a material fact, and 
misrepresentation or suppression of it avoids the policy.”). But see Kronman, supra 
note 1, at 26–27 (explaining the rule that health or life insurance applicants owe the 
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Some modern commentators have urged the abolition of the rule 
of full disclosure in insurance contracts on the grounds that the rule 
originated in the context of maritime insurance, when vessels were 
typically insured once they were already at sea and could not be in-
spected.45 Accordingly, they argue that such rules have no place in 
modern insurance practice, in which the insurance company typi-
cally can and does conduct a thorough inspection of the insured 
property or person.46 Nonetheless, we predicted that courts are 
more likely to find a duty to disclose when the transaction concerns 
the acquisition of insurance, surety, or a release from liability. 
3. The Transaction Was One in Which the Parties Had Unequal 
Access to Information 
One of the most lasting, if controversial, theories seeking to ex-
plain why courts require disclosure of all material facts in some 
transactions but not others is the theory that courts will require 
disclosure whenever the parties have unequal access to information 
(the “equality of access theory”).47 Professor Kim Lane Scheppele 
has elegantly defined equal access in terms of both structural 
equality and equality of aptitude. For example, she states that 
“[t]wo actors will be said to have equal access to information if 
they (1) have equal probabilities of finding the information if they 
 
insurer a duty of full candor on the grounds that information regarding the health of 
the applicant is nearly always casually acquired). 
45 See, e.g., Bertram Harnett, The Doctrine of Concealment: A Remnant in the Law 
of Insurance, 15 Law & Contemp. Probs. 391, 398–99, 407–10, 413–14 (1950). 
46 Id. at 407–10, 413–14. 
47 Carter v. Boehm, (1766) 97 Eng. Rep. 1162, 1164 (K.B.) (“[E]ither party may be 
innocently silent, as to grounds open to both, to exercise their judgment upon.”); Jen-
kins v. McCormick, 339 P.2d 8, 11 (Kan. 1959) (“There is much authority to the effect 
that if one party to a contract or transaction has superior knowledge, or knowledge 
which is not within the fair and reasonable reach of the other party and which he 
could not discover by the exercise of reasonable diligence, or means of knowledge 
which are not open to both parties alike, he is under a legal obligation to speak.” 
(quoting 23 Am. Jur. Fraud and Deceit § 80 (1940)); Victor Brudney, Insiders, Out-
siders, and Informational Advantages Under the Federal Securities Laws, 93 Harv. L. 
Rev. 322, 354–55 (1979) (defining equality of access as an informational advantage 
that cannot be overcome legally by the uninformed party, regardless of her diligence 
or monetary resources); Wilson, supra note 30, at 234 (“[T]he common law imposes 
no duty of disclosure where the facts suppressed are equally accessible to both parties 
to the transaction.”). 
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put in the same level of effort and (2) are capable of making this 
equivalent level of effort.”48 
People most often have different probabilities of information de-
tection because of structural inequality—in other words, they 
“have structurally unequal access to knowledge.”49 In contrast, 
when two people are unable to expend the same level of effort in 
information production, it is most often because one does not even 
realize that the information might exist, or is too lacking in intellec-
tual capability or social knowledge to compete with more sophisti-
cated parties.50 
Relying on Laidlaw to underpin her theory, Professor Scheppele 
points to Chief Justice Marshall’s dictum that “[i]t would be diffi-
cult to circumscribe the contrary doctrine [that is, the doctrine that 
disclosure is required] within proper limits, where the means of in-
telligence are equally accessible to both parties”51 to develop an ar-
gument that the case outcome can be explained by the fact that the 
parties had equal access to information. This assumption might 
seem surprising, given the clear evidence that, due to Organ’s spe-
cial connection to the only three people in New Orleans with 
knowledge of the end of the war, Laidlaw could not have discov-
ered the information without expending considerably more effort 
than Organ. Scheppele argues, however, that Organ’s discovery of 
the information was purely fortuitous—Laidlaw was just as likely 
as Organ to have a partner with a brother aboard the British fleet 
who came ashore during the night with news that the war had 
ended.52 
Despite Professor Scheppele’s innovative attempts to clarify the 
equality of access theory, it remains extraordinarily open-ended 
and subjective, leading many critics, including one of the present 
authors, to dismiss the test as providing no meaningful guidance for 
 
48 Scheppele, supra note 2, at 120. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. at 121. 
51 Laidlaw, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) at 195. 
52 Scheppele, supra note 2, at 122 (“It seems that Organ got his information through 
a friend who had a brother in the know. Laidlaw’s agent, if he had had the same for-
tune, also could have got the information this way.”). 
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courts.53 Needless to say, reasonable minds can wildly differ on 
what constitutes equal access, and coding for a factor so susceptible 
to personal interpretation was difficult. 
Nonetheless, we attempted to address the problem by laying 
down bright-line rules. Most importantly, in contrast to Professor 
Scheppele, we defined access as purely structural. Even gross dif-
ferences in education or knowledge did not impact our determina-
tion of whether equality of access was lacking. Instead, we dealt 
with such differences by including a separate code for parties who 
are illiterate, elderly, severely ill, or extraordinarily mentally defi-
cient in some way (although still competent to contract).54 
Furthermore, we did not, as some commentators might, auto-
matically code purchasers and sellers of real or personal property 
as having unequal access to information. Instead, if a casual inspec-
tion of the property would have revealed the undisclosed informa-
tion, then we concluded that the parties had equal access to the in-
formation in question, despite the fact that purchasers must have 
sellers’ permission before inspecting the property. We felt that this 
definition was reasonable, given the ease with which the purchaser 
could request and execute such an inspection, and the suspicion 
that should arise in the purchaser’s mind if the seller refuses the 
request. Based on the work of Professor Scheppele and other 
equality of access advocates, we predicted that courts are more 
likely to impose disclosure duties when the parties have unequal 
access to the withheld information. 
 
53 For example, one of the present authors has argued previously that, because both 
individual aptitude and structural access vary across the population in relation to 
wealth and education, no two people are ever truly equal. Instead, access is a contin-
uum on which cases of clear inequality or relative equality can be identified at the ex-
tremes, but that none of the definitions endorsed by the equality of access advocates 
gives meaningful guidance as to where to draw the line in the large majority of cases, 
which fall in the middle of the continuum. Kimberly D. Krawiec, Fairness, Efficiency 
& Insider Trading: Deconstructing the Coin of the Realm in the Information Age, 95 
Nw. U. L. Rev. 443 (2001); see also Ian Ayres & Stephen Choi, Internalizing Outsider 
Trading, 101 Mich. L. Rev. 313, 314–21 (2002) (raising a similar argument). 
54 See infra Section I.D.3 (discussing this variable). 
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4. The Transaction Concerned the Transfer of Real Property 
It has been argued by some commentators that courts impose a 
greater duty of disclosure with regard to the transfer of real prop-
erty than in other types of transactions, a rule that apparently dates 
back to the Roman civil law.55 At common law, this rule might have 
been the result of implied warranties of habitability and title.56 In 
many states today, much of the common law in this area has been 
superseded by statutes that mandate high levels of disclosure in 
real estate transactions, particularly residential ones. We predicted 
that courts are more likely to impose a duty to disclose when the 
transaction concerns the transfer of real property. 
5. The Transaction Concerned the Transfer of a Slave 
Slavery cases of all kinds have understandably generated signifi-
cant interest not only in the legal literature, but in history and eco-
nomics as well.57 Although one might expect that courts would 
formulate different disclosure rules in slave sale cases than in other 
sale of goods cases, in recognition of the fact that the property at 
issue is a human being, a review of the cases should quickly dis-
abuse the reader of that notion. 
For example, courts could have used the rule that bargaining 
parties have a duty to disclose defects likely to cause personal in-
jury as a basis for imposing a duty to disclose any illness or injury 
 
55 See, e.g., Cicero, On Moral Obligation (De Oficiis) ¶ 65, at 159 (John 
Higginbotham trans., Univ. of Calif. Press 1967) (“As far as estates are concerned, it 
is laid down in our civil law that all faults known to the seller be declared at the time 
of the sale.”). See generally John V. Orth, Sale of Defective Houses, 6 Green Bag 163 
(2003) (discussing the common law of disclosure in connection with the sale of real 
property). 
56 As to title, see Pothier, supra note 10, ¶ 240, at 145 (noting that the vendor must 
declare “that the thing does not belong to him; that it does not belong to him irrevo-
cably; or that it is subject to certain charges, annuities (rentes) [sic], or special hy-
pothecations”). 
57 See, e.g., 1 Judicial Cases concerning American Slavery and the Negro (Helen T. 
Catterall ed., William S. Hein & Co. 1998) (1926); Judith Kelleher Schafer, Slavery, 
the Civil Law, and the Supreme Court of Louisiana (1994); Andrew Fede, Legal Pro-
tection for Slave Buyers in the U.S. South: A Caveat Concerning Caveat Emptor, 31 
Am. J. Legal Hist. 322 (1987); Mark Tushnet, New Histories of the Private Law of 
Slavery, 18 Cardozo L. Rev. 301 (1996); Jenny B. Wahl, The Jurisprudence of Ameri-
can Slave Sales, 56 J. Econ. Hist. 143 (1996). 
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in a slave, the rationale being that lack of disclosure prevents the 
purchaser from seeking medical attention for the slave. Instead, 
however, courts of the era deciding disclosure issues seem to have 
treated slaves much like any other personal property.58 
This is not to say, however, that special disclosure rules did not 
arise in connection with slavery cases. In fact, economic and legal 
historians have argued that, although the southern states generally 
observed a rule of strict caveat emptor much more frequently than 
did the northeastern states, southern states attempted to regulate 
the slavery market because of the importance of the slave trade to 
the southern economy, in part by imposing disclosure duties on 
parties to a slave sale.59 Interestingly, this rule too dates back to 
Roman law.60 We predicted that courts are more likely to find that 
the informed party has a duty to disclose when the transaction in-
volves the sale of a slave. 
C. How the Information Was Acquired 
Many commentators have argued that the method by which the 
undisclosed information was acquired has an impact on whether 
courts require disclosure of the information. Specifically, it has 
been asserted that courts more frequently require the disclosure of 
 
58 In fact, the argument that illness or injury in a slave falls within the well-
recognized exception for disclosures of defects likely to cause bodily injury was not 
raised in any of the cases in our dataset, presumably because of the deeply ingrained 
notion among many southerners of that era (including judges and counsel in the 
cases) that the southern legal system treats slaves as goods, rather than as individuals 
whose well-being should be protected by the legal system. See Wahl, supra note 57, at 
146 n.7 (referring to livestock sales as slave sales’ “closest relative”). 
59 See, e.g., Fede, supra note 57 (arguing that slave sales were more heavily policed 
by the courts, which imposed protections such as warranties of titles and soundness, 
foreshadowing the development of the U.C.C.); Wahl, supra note 57, at 146–49 (argu-
ing that southern courts imposed higher disclosure obligations in slave sales than in 
other sales transactions). But see Dalley, Law of Deceit, supra note 2, at 430 (finding 
less protection of buyers against fraud in slave cases than in some other types of cases, 
such as those involving land, horses, and corporate securities). 
60 Cicero, supra note 55, ¶ 71, at 161 (“It is not only in the sphere of real estate that 
civil law, which is based on the natural law, condemns trickery and fraud, but also in 
the case of slave-purchase the buyer is protected by law against deception. Indeed an 
edict of the aediles lays down that if the seller knows that the slave is a weakling, a 
runaway or a thief, he must (except in the case of an inherited slave) declare it.”). 
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casually acquired information and information acquired through 
illegal or tortious means. 
1. The Information Was Casually, as Opposed to Deliberately, 
Acquired 
That the law should reward those who expend time and effort to 
acquire information by permitting them to reap the benefits of 
bargaining with others without revealing that information is one of 
the earliest theories offered by legal commentators to explain the 
law of fraudulent silence. In De Officiis, Cicero constructs a hypo-
thetical in which a merchant sails to Rhodes from Alexandria with 
a shipment of corn during a time of great famine in Rhodes.61 The 
merchant knows that other ships have set sail from Alexandria to 
Rhodes with enough corn to alleviate the famine and will arrive 
shortly. In an imaginary dialogue, the Stoic philosophers Antipater 
and Diogenes debate whether the merchant should be required to 
reveal all that he knows.62 
Discussing the hypothetical in his 1761 Treatise on Obligations, 
the French legal theorist R.J. Pothier agrees with Cicero’s conclu-
sion that the merchant should disclose his secret information. He 
acknowledges, however, that the majority of other writers on the 
subject have considered the merchant’s profits to be made by non-
disclosure “not an unjust profit; but a just reward for the diligence 
which enabled him to arrive the first, and for the risk which he ran 
of losing his merchandise, if any of the accidents, to which he was 
exposed, should have prevented his arrival at the time.”63 Similarly, 
writing in 1936, Professor W. Page Keeton argued that the manner 
in which the informed party acquired his information is relevant to 
courts’ determinations of disclosure duties, noting that, “[t]he in-
 
61 Id. ¶ 50, at 153–54. 
62 Id. ¶¶ 51–53, at 154. In the hypothetical, Antipater argues that “he should tell 
everything, so that the buyer can be just as much in possession of the facts as the 
seller.” Id. ¶ 51, at 154. Diogenes responds that “these bonds [of social unity] are not 
such that a man may not have anything to call his own. If that is so, there is not even 
any selling to be done, only giving.” Id. ¶ 53, at 154. 
63 Pothier, supra note 10, ¶ 242, at 148. Although he agrees with Cicero’s conclu-
sions, Pothier also notes, “[t]he decision of Cicero meets with much difficulty even in 
the forum of conscience. The greater number of those who have written upon natural 
law have regarded it as going too far.” Id. 
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formation might have been acquired as the result of his bringing to 
bear a superior knowledge, intelligence, skill or technical judg-
ment,” or “it might have been acquired by mere chance.”64 
Professor Anthony Kronman elaborated on this theory by argu-
ing that the seemingly inconsistent results in similar cases involving 
the nondisclosure of relevant facts could be reconciled by noting 
that when nondisclosure is permitted, the knowledge involved is 
typically the result of a deliberate search.65 Kronman argued that a 
rule permitting silence in such instances was a sensible economic 
policy, as it represented the only effective means of providing in-
centives for the production of costly information that would not 
normally be discovered, absent a deliberate search.66 Although 
Kronman conceded that Organ’s information appeared to be ac-
quired fortuitously, rather than deliberately (recall that Organ’s 
business partner’s brother had been at sea with the British fleet 
and arrived in New Orleans during the middle of the night, tipping 
Organ about the soon-to-be-disclosed news of the war’s end), he 
believed that this did not undermine his theory. Instead, Kronman 
argued that Marshall’s decision resulted from an attempt to lay 
down a blanket rule concerning the disclosure of market informa-
tion, which is typically, though not always, deliberately acquired.67 
Like Professor Kronman, we define “deliberately acquired in-
formation” as “information whose acquisition entails costs which 
would not have been incurred but for the likelihood, however 
 
64 Keeton, supra note 13, at 25. See also Hays v. Meyers, 107 S.W. 287, 288 (Ky. 
1908) (stating that a party has no duty to disclose “the superior knowledge of property 
he desires to purchase that has been acquired by skill, energy, vigilance, and other le-
gitimate means” and stating further that “[i]f any other rule were adopted, it would 
have a depressing tendency on trade and commerce by removing the incentive to 
speculation and profit that lies at the foundation of almost every business venture”); 
Wilson, supra note 30, at 231 (“[T]he common law . . . declares that men should as a 
general rule take care of themselves, and that some incentive to diligence and discre-
tion in their affairs should be afforded, by giving them, in ordinary transactions, the 
benefit of their industry and discernment.”). 
65 Kronman, supra note 1, at 9. Although Professor Kronman limited his theory to 
“socially productive information,” we find this distinction unnecessary to test his hy-
pothesis. In practice, it is difficult to conceive of examples of failures to disclose so-
cially unproductive information that would result in demonstrable damages to the 
plaintiff, thus resulting in litigation and written judicial opinions. 
66 Id. 
67 See infra note 73 and accompanying text. 
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great, that the information in question would actually be pro-
duced.”68 The costs of acquiring such information might include not 
only direct search costs, but also the costs of developing any 
needed expertise, such as, for example, the costs of attending busi-
ness school or studying the values of art or antiques.69 
Casually acquired information, by contrast, is information the 
acquisition of which entails costs that would have been incurred 
even if the information were not forthcoming.70 To illustrate, a 
businessman who overhears information while riding on a bus has 
acquired the information casually, except in the unlikely event that 
he rides buses specifically for that purpose.71 
Professor Kronman recognized that, although analytically useful, 
the determination as to whether any given piece of information 
was deliberately or casually acquired in any instance was a difficult 
one for courts to make in the real world.72 Accordingly, he argued 
that, rather than make case-by-case determinations as to the man-
ner of information acquisition, courts should adopt blanket rules 
regarding whether the kind of information involved in a particular 
class of case (say, real estate purchases, or the sale of a good with a 
latent defect) was generally more likely to be generated deliber-
ately or casually, as doing so would be more efficient.73 
In contrast to using Professor Kronman’s classification of the 
case in question, we judged whether information was acquired 
casually or deliberately based on the facts of the case. We did this 
for several reasons. First, although Kronman discussed general 
rules as to the likely means of information acquisition in certain 
classes of cases (for example, market information, the knowledge 
of purchasers and sellers of real property, and information relating 
to the health of an applicant for health or life insurance), he did 
not lay down general classifications for every possible range of 
facts. Accordingly, any attempt to apply blanket rules would have 
 
68 Kronman, supra note 1, at 13. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. 
71 Id. at 13 & n.38 
72 Id. at 13. 
73 Id. at 17–18. 
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required significant fact-specific inquiry to create such rules for all 
classes of cases contained in our sample set. 
Second, coding individual cases on their own facts enabled us to 
test not only the robustness of the deliberately/casually acquired 
distinction, but also Professor Kronman’s empirical claims as to the 
likely mode of information acquisition in those classes of cases for 
which he suggested blanket rules. In other words, coding in this 
manner permitted us to judge, for example, whether extrinsic in-
formation is typically acquired deliberately, as contended by 
Kronman. 
Other commentators disagree that the deliberately/casually ac-
quired information distinction is a meaningful predictor of the out-
comes of fraudulent silence cases.74 Our own view embarking on 
this project was that, regardless of whether Professor Kronman’s 
theory was sound from an economic policy perspective, it was diffi-
cult to apply in practice and had not been embraced by courts out-
side the Seventh Circuit.75 Despite these critiques of Kronman’s 
conjecture, we predicted a significant relationship between 
whether the information was casually acquired and the likelihood 
that a court would impose disclosure duties. 
2. The Information Was Acquired Through Illegal or Tortious 
Means 
Courts and commentators often take the position that informa-
tion acquired by illegal or tortious means must be disclosed to a 
contracting counterparty.76 A standard example is that if A tres-
passes upon B’s land and while there conducts a test and deter-
 
74 See, e.g., DeMott, supra note 2, at 68–69, 85; Scheppele, supra note 2, at 124–26. 
75 The influence of Judges Easterbrook and Posner in the Seventh Circuit, their em-
brace of law and economics principles, and their familiarity with academic theory led 
us to this hypothesis. See, e.g., FDIC v. W.R. Grace & Co., 877 F.2d 614, 619 (7th Cir. 
1989) (Posner, J.) (opining that a seller had a duty to disclose material information 
obtained “without substantial investment . . . which the buyer would find either im-
possible or very costly to discover himself”). 
76 See, e.g., Mallon Oil v. Brown/Edwards Assoc., 965 P.2d 105, 111–12 (Colo. 1998); 
George Spencer Bower, The Law of Actionable Misrepresentation 107 (Sir Alexan-
der Kingcome Turner ed., 3d ed. 1974); Keeton, supra note 13, at 25–26; Donna M. 
Nagy, Reframing the Misappropriation Theory of Insider Trading Liability: A Post-
O’Hagan Suggestion, 59 Ohio St. L.J. 1223, 1290–92 (1998). 
2ND SUB_KRAWIECZEILERBOOK.DOC 11/17/2005  10:32:28 AM 
1822 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 91:1795 
mines that oil is located on the land, if A subsequently purchases 
the land from B without disclosing to B the presence of oil on his 
land, B might have a right to rescind the contract.77 We predicted 
that courts are significantly more likely to find a duty to disclose 
when the information is acquired by illegal or tortious means. 
D. Characteristics of the Uninformed Party 
Commentators frequently assert that court rulings are influenced 
by certain characteristics of the uninformed party. We hypothe-
sized that courts require disclosure more frequently when the unin-
formed party is a buyer or lessee; when the uninformed party is 
female; and when the uninformed party is sick, disabled, illiterate, 
elderly, or otherwise severely disadvantaged in the bargaining rela-
tionship, although still competent to contract. 
1. The Uninformed Party Was the Buyer or Lessee 
Commentators seem to agree that sellers have a higher obliga-
tion to disclose information affecting the value of the transaction 
than do buyers, although they disagree as to why courts make this 
distinction.78 Professor Keeton explains the rule as follows: “The 
buyer is not ordinarily expected to disclose information greatly af-
 
77 Keeton, supra note 13, at 26; see also Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 161 
cmt. d, illus. 11 (1979) (stating that information acquired through trespass must be dis-
closed). 
78 See, e.g., Pothier, supra note 10, ¶¶ 294–98, at 180–82 (stating that vendees have 
lesser disclosure obligations than vendors because the vendor ought to be aware of 
the value of what he sells); Scheppele, supra note 2, at 130–33 (arguing that sellers 
have greater disclosure duties than purchasers because sellers are more likely to have 
access to the information in question); DeMott, supra note 2, at 76 (“[B]uyers in many 
settings are able to withhold with impunity information comparable to information 
that a seller is obliged to disclose.”); William B. Goldfarb, Fraud and Nondisclosure in 
the Vendor-Purchaser Relation, 8 W. Res. L. Rev. 5, 26 (1956) (arguing that sellers 
have disclosure duties that exceed those of buyers); Kronman, supra note 1, at 22–23 
(stating that buyers in a real estate context have lesser disclosure obligations than 
sellers because buyers are likely to acquire their information deliberately, whereas 
sellers are more likely to acquire their information casually); Andrew Kull, Unilateral 
Mistake: The Baseball Card Case, 70 Wash. U. L.Q. 57, 62 & n.7 (1992) (arguing that 
sellers are more often found to have a duty to disclose material information unknown 
to the buyer because sellers are subject to implied warranties, whereas buyers are 
not). 
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fecting the value of the property which is the subject-matter of the 
sale, whereas the seller is expected to disclose defects in the prop-
erty sold which greatly decrease the value of the property.”79 
Given this widespread agreement among commentators, we pre-
dicted that courts are significantly more likely to impose disclosure 
duties when the uninformed party is the buyer. 
2. The Uninformed Party Was Female 
Historically, courts and legislatures have used a variety of theo-
ries to limit the rights of women to contract freely. For example, in 
the early twentieth century, courts upheld laws designed to im-
prove working conditions for women against challenges based on 
interference with the freedom of contract—challenges that had 
been used successfully to invalidate similar laws that applied to 
men.80 
Sometimes, the limitations on women’s freedom of contract are 
explicit, as they were under the doctrine of coverture, which 
treated the family as a unit and the husband as the head of that 
unit. As a result of coverture, married women were not permitted 
to enter into contracts or sue or be sued in court.81 
 
79 Keeton, supra note 13, at 35–36. 
80 Compare, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905) (holding unconstitu-
tional a state law regulating working hours), with West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 
300 U.S. 379, 400 (1937) (upholding a Washington state statute setting minimum 
wages for women only); see also Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 416 (1908) (uphold-
ing an Oregon statute establishing maximum working hours for women, but not for 
men); Commonwealth v. Hamilton Mfg. Co., 120 Mass. 383, 385 (1876) (upholding a 
Massachusetts statute prohibiting the employment of women and persons under the 
age of eighteen in any manufacturing establishment for more than sixty hours per 
week). But see Children’s Hosp. v. Adkins, 284 F. 613, 618 (D.C. Cir. 1922) (invalidat-
ing a District of Columbia law setting minimum wages for women but not for men); 
Ritchie v. People, 40 N.E. 454, 462 (Ill. 1895) (invalidating an Illinois law limiting the 
working hours of women). 
81 See generally Judith Resnik, Categorical Federalism: Jurisdiction, Gender, and 
the Globe, 111 Yale L.J. 619, 636 (2001) (discussing the law of coverture); Reva B. 
Siegel, She the People: The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex Equality, Federalism, and 
the Family, 115 Harv. L. Rev. 947, 982–83 (2002) (same). In theory at least, restric-
tions on women’s rights to contract under the doctrine of coverture were abolished 
during the nineteenth century, with the widespread passage of married women’s 
property acts. Id. at 983 (“It is often said that the married women’s property acts abol-
ished the common law of coverture in the nineteenth century—a legal fiction if ever 
there was one. Even the briefest look at antisuffrage discourse reveals that core con-
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Other limitations on women’s freedom of contract are more sub-
tle, as when women, due to their “delicate” nature or a perceived 
need to protect them from their own bad bargains, are permitted to 
rescind their contracts based on protective doctrines such as fraud, 
duress, or unconscionability, when the same contract would have 
been enforced against a man.82 We hypothesized, therefore, that 
these gendered notions might have found their way into the law of 
fraudulent silence, especially in older cases, and predicted that a 
court is more likely to find a duty to disclose secret information 
when the uninformed party is female than when the uninformed 
party is male. 
3. The Uninformed Party Was Sick, Disabled, Illiterate, or Elderly, 
Though Competent to Contract 
It has been argued that, in the law of fraudulent silence, as else-
where, courts often rule in favor of sympathetic plaintiffs.83 Accord-
ingly, courts might impose disclosure duties more readily when the 
uninformed party is competent to contract, but is sick, disabled, il-
literate, elderly, or extraordinarily mentally deficient in some way. 
Our goal was to identify contracting parties who even the most 
 
cepts of coverture were a vibrant part of American legal culture well into the twenti-
eth century and shaped public as well as private law.”). 
82 See, e.g., Mary Joe Frug, Re-Reading Contracts: A Feminist Analysis of a Con-
tracts Casebook, 34 Am. U. L. Rev. 1065, 1085–86 (1985) (arguing that, in Jackson v. 
Seymour, the court allowed Lucy Jackson to rescind a contract for the sale of land to 
her brother because of “gendered ideas” about the vulnerability and financial de-
pendence of widows, rather than because of the confidential nature of their relation-
ship); Debora L. Threedy, Feminists & Contract Doctrine, 32 Ind. L. Rev. 1247, 1262 
(1999) (stating that, “[m]any contract doctrines are paternalistic in the sense of pro-
tecting the ‘weaker’ or disadvantaged party: concealment, misrepresentation, unilat-
eral mistake, undue influence, duress, unconscionability, minority, and lack of capac-
ity all could be said to have a protectionist cast,” and noting further that, “[f]eminists 
have just begun to question whether paternalistic doctrines like unconscionability 
help or harm women”). But see Margo Schlanger, Injured Women before Common 
Law Courts, 1860–1930, 21 Harv. Women’s L.J. 79, 140 (1998) (finding that courts 
fairly “treated gender as an important factor in assessing appropriate standards of 
care, where perceived gender difference was highlighted” in tort cases). 
83 Cf. DeMott, supra note 2, at 97 (“To an unusual degree, judicial opinions in 
[fraudulent silence] cases . . . personalize the parties.”); Strudler, supra note 4, at 340 
(arguing that nondisclosure law should “pay attention to the moral drama that occurs 
in bargaining and to the sources of individual negotiators’ grievances about exploita-
tion, deception, and betrayal”). 
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conservative courts might readily consider easy targets in need of 
protection from unscrupulous predators. We predicted, therefore, 
that courts are significantly more likely to impose a duty to disclose 
when the uninformed party is sick, disabled, elderly, or illiterate. 
E. Behavior of the Informed Party 
Just as the characteristics of the uninformed party might impact 
court rulings, the informed party’s behavior might influence court 
decisions regarding the need for disclosure in any given transac-
tion. Specifically, when the informed party has “behaved badly,” 
courts might be more likely to punish or discourage such behavior 
through the imposition of disclosure duties that deprive the in-
formed party of the opportunity to legally profit from her secret in-
formation. Accordingly, we examined two types of bad behavior by 
the informed party: affirmative misrepresentations or half-truths 
that accompany the undisclosed information, and active conceal-
ment of the undisclosed information. 
1. The Informed Party Made Affirmative Misrepresentations or 
Half-Truths 
Fraudulent silence claims often form one part of a larger claim in 
which other wrongs are alleged, such as affirmative misrepresenta-
tions or half-truths. Although technically courts should rule on 
each count of the complaint separately and should not allow a find-
ing that the informed party intentionally misrepresented one fact 
to impact the court’s finding on liability for a different, undisclosed 
fact,84 we believe that courts are often swayed by a general pattern 
of bad conduct on the part of the informed party.85 Accordingly, we 
would expect to see disclosure required more often when the in-
 
84 This is the case unless, of course, the informed party’s lies somehow prevented the 
uninformed party from learning the truth. 
85 Wilson, supra note 30, at 234 (“‘If a word . . . if a single word, be dropped which 
tends to mislead the vendor’ it will vitiate the contract. Thus it is, that in the mass of 
cases in which concealment or fraudulent silence appears, there is also present this 
misrepresentation . . . .” (quoting Turner v. Harvey, (1821) 37 Eng. Rep. 814, 818 (Ch. 
D.))). 
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formed party also made affirmative misrepresentations or half-
truths than when the informed party was truly silent. 
A half-truth is a statement that, although technically accurate, is 
nonetheless misleading in some way.86 As stated in the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts, “[a] representation stating the truth so far as it 
goes but which the maker knows or believes to be materially mis-
leading because of his failure to state additional or qualifying mat-
ter is a fraudulent misrepresentation.”87 
Similarly, the Restatement (Second) of Contracts states that “[a] 
statement may be true with respect to the facts stated, but may fail 
to include qualifying matter necessary to prevent the implication of 
an assertion that is false with respect to other facts.”88 To illustrate, 
the Restatement (Second) of Contracts notes that a true statement 
that an event has recently occurred might nonetheless mislead, if it 
creates the false impression that matters have not changed subse-
quently.89 
Professor Donald Langevoort has correctly noted that there is 
no bright line between affirmative misrepresentations and half-
truths, or between half-truths and nondisclosure.90 Instead, all three 
arise in transactional settings in which the parties typically trade 
large amounts of information and, thus, represent a continuum, 
making coding at the margins sometimes difficult.91 Nonetheless, 
we predicted that courts are more likely to impose a duty to dis-
close when the informed party lied or told a half-truth in the same 
transaction in which she failed to disclose material information, 
 
86 Langevoort, supra note 29, at 88–89; see also Goldfarb, supra note 78, at 24 
(“While silence alone may not be actionable, if the vendor undertakes to speak, he 
must not conceal anything which would tend to qualify or contradict the facts which 
he had stated. In other words, to tell half of the truth is to make a half-false represen-
tation.”). 
87 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 529 (1976). The Restatement elaborates, “[A] 
statement that contains only favorable matters and omits all reference to unfavorable 
matters is as much a false representation as if all the facts stated were untrue.” Re-
statement (Second) of Torts § 529 cmt. a (1976). 
88 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 159 cmt. b (1979). 
89 Id. 
90 Langevoort, supra note 29, at 95–96. 
91 Id. at 96; cf. Goldfarb, supra note 78, at 25 (noting that “a business transaction is 
never entirely without conversation, and verbal exchanges nearly always involve, ex-
pressly or by implication, representations of fact”). 
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than when the informed party’s silence is unaccompanied by lies or 
half-truths. 
2. The Informed Party Actively Concealed Information 
It frequently has been asserted that if the informed party takes 
some affirmative steps to prevent detection of the truth by the un-
informed party, then courts are more likely to require disclosure. 
As one commentator states, “[c]oncealment involves some positive 
action on the part of one to prevent the other from ascertaining 
some material fact, which without the interference he would 
probably have discovered.”92 
For example, the seller of land might cover a landfill, ditch, or 
other defect on the property with dirt and then fail to disclose this 
information to prospective purchasers.93 Similarly, if the unin-
formed party inquires about certain facts, the informed party might 
lead him (through words or actions) in a direction where the facts 
cannot be found.94 We predicted that courts are more likely to re-
quire disclosure in such instances than in a case where the seller 
had merely remained silent about some information, but had taken 
no steps to prevent discovery by the purchaser. 
F. Case Date 
One of the goals of this study was to identify any historical pat-
terns in the data. Specifically, the aim was to test the frequently re-
peated but never empirically tested hypothesis that the doctrine of 
 
92 Wilson, supra note 30, at 233; see also Goldfarb, supra note 78, at 10 (distinguish-
ing between “active concealment and mere nondisclosure”). 
93 See Merchants Bank v. Campbell, 75 Va. 455, 460–61 (1881) (finding fraud where 
defendants stopped up the entrance to a valuable cavern and told plaintiffs that it was 
“nothing but a mud-hole”); Schneider v. Heath, (1813) 170 Eng. Rep. 1462, 1463 
(K.B.) (finding fraud where defendants had removed a ship from the ways, where it 
had been sitting dry, and docked it in the water so that the plaintiffs could not observe 
defects on the bottom of the boat). 
94 See, e.g., Stewart v. Wyoming Cattle Ranche Co., 128 U.S. 383, 389 (1888) (find-
ing fraud where defendant prevented plaintiff’s agent from making inquiries which 
would have revealed material negative information); Chrisholm v. Gadsden, 1 S.C.L. 
(1 Strob.) 220, 224 (1847) (finding fraud where, in response to the uninformed party’s 
inquiries, the informed party sent him to inspect an area of property where he knew 
the defect could not be discovered). 
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caveat emptor had faded in importance over time and that, corre-
spondingly, common-law disclosure duties had increased during 
the time period of our study (approximately 1789 to May 15, 
2002).95 It has been asserted, in particular, that the law governing 
latent defects became more pro-disclosure in recent years.96 
The most commonly asserted rationale for this perceived trend is 
an economic one: As America was transformed from an agrarian 
economy, in which people typically transacted primarily with per-
sons whom they knew, to a commercial economy in which people 
regularly transacted with complete strangers, the law became more 
protective of the rights of uninformed parties in order to encourage 
commerce.97 In other words, legal changes occurred in response to 
economic changes. 
We predicted, therefore, that the more recently a case was de-
cided, the more likely a court would be to find that the informed 
party owed the uninformed party a duty to disclose. In addition, 
given Professor Kronman’s claim regarding the trend over time for 
cases involving latent defects, we predicted that, for cases in which 
the withheld information related to a latent defect, courts would be 
more likely to find a duty to disclose during the period 1958 
through 1983, as compared to the years before 1958. 
 
95 See, e.g., Keeton, supra note 13, at 31 (“[I]t is of course apparent that the content 
of the maxim ‘caveat emptor,’ used in its broader meaning of imposing risks on both 
parties to a transaction, has been greatly limited since its origin.”); Kronman, supra 
note 1, at 24; Saul Levmore, Securities and Secrets: Insider Trading and the Law of 
Contracts, 68 Va. L. Rev. 117, 133–34 (1982) (“Modern cases, however, can be read as 
signaling a trend toward increased disclosure requirements.”). But see Dalley, Law of 
Deceit, supra note 2, at 441 (finding that the law of deceit did not become more pro-
tective of the rights of uninformed parties from 1790–1860); Goldfarb, supra note 78, 
at 9 (“Writers who believe that [caveat emptor] has lost much of its content seem to be 
misreading the bulk of the decisions.”). 
96 Kronman, supra note 1, at 24 (arguing that, in “the last twenty-five years,” disclo-
sure duties regarding latent defects have increased dramatically). 
97 Horwitz, supra note 17, at 198–201 (arguing that, as markets and commerce be-
came depersonalized, courts shifted their focus toward requiring disclosure of infor-
mation not available to both parties, in contrast to both the strict caveat emptor and 
the fair price doctrines that had preceded it); see also Wahl, supra note 57, at 147 
(“The doctrine of caveat emptor for sales replaced the sound-price rule (which pre-
sumed that any item sold at full price was sound) by the early 1800s and remained 
strong through the early twentieth century.”). 
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G. Court 
1. Geographic Patterns 
We also wanted to determine whether any geographical patterns 
emerged in the cases. In particular, we wanted to test the assertion 
by some legal and economic historians that southern states were 
historically much less likely to impose disclosure duties on bargain-
ing parties than were states in other regions.98 
We predicted that courts in the South would be less likely to im-
pose disclosure duties as compared to other regions during two 
early periods: 1793–1860 and 1861–1940.99 In addition, we exam-
ined regional trends in a recent period, 1941–2002. 
2. Differences Between Federal and State Courts 
Although we are not aware of any assertions made by commen-
tators that differences exist among the cases according to jurisdic-
tion, we wanted to test for such differences, both between state and 
federal courts, and among the federal circuit courts. Because com-
mentators have not asserted that such differences exist, we pre-
dicted that neither the deciding court’s circuit nor the deciding 
court’s nature as state or federal would have a significant influence 
on the probability that a court would find a duty to disclose. 
Table 1 summarizes the hypotheses discussed throughout this 
Part. In addition, the table presents a summary of the basic results 
obtained from our regression analyses, the details of which appear 
in Part III. 
 
 
98 See, e.g., Dalley, Law of Deceit, supra note 2, at 431–32 (studying cases decided 
between 1790 and 1860 and claiming that cases in the South resulted in more pro-
seller decisions than other regions). 
99 These dates were chosen somewhat arbitrarily because those who made claims 
about the South did not specify what they meant by “historically.” The dates we chose 
correspond roughly with the end of the Civil War, which marks the last period of 
Dalley’s dataset, and the beginning of World War II. Both events were highly signifi-
cant for the South. 
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Table 1 
Summary of Hypotheses and Regression Results 
Dependent Variable:  Log odds of court finding a duty to disclose 
 
PREDICTED SIGN REGRESSION
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE OF COEFFICIENT RESULTS
Type of Information:
Information was intrinsic + / NO EFFECT NO EFFECT
Undisclosed information concerned 
personal intentions or opinions
—  — / NO EFFECT
Undisclosed information related to a 
latent defect
+ +
Information concerned a defect likely to 
cause bodily injury
+ NO EFFECT
Information concerned a defect likely to 
cause property damage
+ NO EFFECT
Information would have updated or 
corrected previously disclosed 
information
+ +
Type of Transaction:
Parties to transaction in a confidential or 
fiduciary relationship
+ +
Transaction concerned acquisition of 
insurance
+ NO EFFECT
Transaction concerned release from 
liability
+ NO EFFECT
Parties had unequal access to information + +
Transaction concerned the transfer of 
real property
+ + / NO EFFECT
Transaction concerned the transfer of a 
slave
+ Perfect predictor**
Type of Acquisition:
Information was casually acquired + + / NO EFFECT
Information was acquired through illegal 
or tortious means
+ NO EFFECT
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Table 1 (continued): 
 
PREDICTED SIGN REGRESSION
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE OF COEFFICIENT RESULTS
Uninformed Party Characteristics:
Uninformed party was the buyer or 
lessee
+ +
Uninformed party was female + NO EFFECT
Uninformed party was sick, disabled, 
illiterate or elderly
+ +
Informed Party Characteristics:
Informed party made affirmative 
misrepresentations
+ +
Informed party concealed information + +
Informed party told a half-truth + +
Time Trends:
Year case was decided + —
Geographic Trends*:
Decision made by state court NO EFFECT + / NO EFFECT
3rd Cir:  — / NO 
EFFECT         
6th Cir:  — 
7th Cir:  —
Decision made by federal circuit court NO EFFECT
 
 
*  The predictions and results pertaining to the effects of the regional location of the court are 
provided in detail in Part III. 
**  This variable is dropped from all regressions because, in each of the three cases involving 
slaves, the court found a duty to disclose. 
 
TABLE 1: This table provides a summary of the hypotheses derived from the literature regard-
ing the factors influencing courts to find a duty to disclose and results from regressions used to 
test these hypotheses. Note that the table reports the results from all specifications. Indetermi-
nate results indicate that the results are not robust to all specifications. 
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II. DATA COLLECTION 
A. The Available Cases 
Like many other studies attempting to empirically examine case 
law or judicial developments, this study is limited to the Westlaw 
database, which does not include all decided cases.100 Instead, West-
law excludes some unpublished cases, thus biasing the results to the 
extent that there is some systematic difference between available 
and unavailable cases. A description of West’s process for choosing 
cases for inclusion in its database is contained in Appendix A. 
In addition, this study accounts for neither the impact of settle-
ment on the type of case that ultimately proceeds to the litigation 
stage nor the impact of judicial statements of case facts on our as-
sumptions regarding what occurred in any given transaction. As 
argued by some commentators, judges may selectively repeat only 
the information that they consider relevant, or may allow their own 
biases to shape their interpretation and description of the facts of 
the case.101 As noted, however, this is typical of all legal analyses 
based on decided cases, including traditional doctrinal legal schol-
arship. 
Given the inherent incompleteness of the Westlaw database, it is 
reasonable to infer that we introduced selection biases into our 
sample. While we acknowledge this, we do not think it limits the 
usefulness of our results given the focus on our study—to test 
commentators’ claims regarding the factors that drive courts to im-
pose a duty to disclose information—because these claims are 
based on the same set of cases from which we drew our sample. 
 
100 A study seeking to examine the case law of a particular jurisdiction for a short 
(and relatively modern) timeframe could examine all decided cases in some courts by 
obtaining unpublished opinions either through Westlaw or Lexis, the individual 
court’s website, the court clerk, or some other collection service. This step is impracti-
cal in a study such as ours, which attempts to analyze a sample of the entire set of fed-
eral and state cases. Furthermore, as discussed in Appendix A, early American cases 
were often unreported, making any historical study of the common law incomplete. 
101 See, e.g., Robert P. Burns, The Lawfulness of the American Trial, 38 Am. Crim. 
L. Rev. 205, 219 (2001) (“[L]awyers . . . often believe that the account of the facts 
provided by appellate courts is deeply unfair.”); Anthony D’Amato, The Ultimate 
Injustice: When a Court Misstates the Facts, 11 Cardozo L. Rev. 1313, 1325–31 (1990) 
(describing Judge Easterbrook’s misstatement of the facts in the case of Branion v. 
Gramly). 
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B. The Collection Process 
We ran our search on May 15, 2002, and retrieved cases in the 
“Allcases-old” and “Allcases” databases on Westlaw. The search 
retrieved 217 cases in the Allcases-old database, resulting in 152 
observations.102 The search retrieved 1086 cases in the Allcases da-
tabase, from which we drew a random sample resulting in 314 ob-
servations, for a total of 466 observations.103 Courts found a duty to 
disclose in 51% of the cases in our sample.104 
1. The Search Terms 
The search terms we employed were: duty /3 disclos! /p fraud /p 
(contract tort) % securities /3 act. Because we focused solely on 
common-law (as opposed to statutory) duties to disclose, we pur-
posely designed the search to exclude cases decided under the fed-
eral statutory securities laws; as a result, we also excluded cases 
that might have referenced these securities laws in reaching a deci-
sion. Consequently, our dataset included only one case involving 
fraudulent silence in connection with the purchase or sale of a se-
curity. 
2. Case Coding 
Case coding was done by research assistants, with the supervi-
sion of one of the authors. Detailed information regarding this 
process is contained in Appendix A. 
Given our focus on common-law rules, cases decided under a 
statute were especially difficult to code. Many states have at-
tempted to codify or expand the law governing fraudulent nondis-
 
102 Some cases are not usable, either because the court failed to reach a decision on 
the merits with respect to the element of duty, because the search terms identified a 
case that does not actually address the question being studied, or because the court’s 
decision did not reflect the common law because it was based on a statute or was im-
pacted by a warranty or waiver. As a result, the number of observations is less than 
the number of cases retrieved. See Appendix A for further explanation on this. 
103 The complete dataset is available from the authors upon request. 
104 Although this statistic is consistent with the predictions of the Priest-Klein model, 
for reasons discussed infra notes 171–174 and accompanying text, we believe this sta-
tistic is anomalous and unrelated to the Priest-Klein model. See George L. Priest & 
Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. Legal Stud. 1, 6 (1984). 
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closure in particular areas, especially real estate sales,105 consumer 
transactions of all types,106 car sales, and health care delivery.107 As 
a result, some cases in these areas (especially more recent cases) 
might be decided under a statute. We did not automatically ex-
clude such cases from our dataset, however. Instead, when the 
statute (or, where relevant, the legislative history) simply prohib-
ited “fraud” without defining it (thus forcing courts to return to the 
common law for a definition) or merely codified the common law, 
we coded the case as if it had been decided under the common law. 
Where the statute attempted to change or expand the common law, 
however, or where the statute specifically imposed liability for a 
failure to disclose (as is typical, for example, in some statutes gov-
erning real estate sales), we excluded the case.108 
Finally, we directed the case coders to make an evaluation of the 
variables in each case that was independent of the court’s evalua-
tion of the variables. This method served three functions: first, and 
most importantly, it was a necessary step to using all of the cases, 
as only rarely did a court draw specific conclusions regarding every 
variable that we desired to code; second, it allowed us to adopt 
bright-line coding rules that reduced subjectivity and eliminated 
the need to master the law across numerous time frames and juris-
dictions; third, it allowed us to minimize the impact of conscious or 
unconscious judicial mischaracterizations of fact. We discuss each 
of these functions, in turn. 
 
105 See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Code § 1102 (West 2005) (delineating the seller’s disclosure 
obligations when transferring real property). 
106 Elizabeth A. Dalberth, Unfair and Deceptive Acts and Practices in Real Estate 
Transactions: The Duty to Disclose Off-Site Environmental Hazards, 97 Dick. L. Rev. 
153, 157 (1992) (noting that, beginning in the mid-1960s and 1970s, states began to en-
act unfair and deceptive act and practices statutes to protect consumers in most trans-
actions). 
107 Grant H. Morris, Dissing Disclosure: Just What the Doctor Ordered, 44 Ariz. L. 
Rev. 313, 334 n.115 (2002) (discussing informed consent statutes); Ryan Steven John-
son, Note, ERISA Doctor in the House? The Duty to Disclose Physician Incentives to 
Limit Health Care, 82 Minn. L. Rev. 1631 (1998) (discussing disclosure duties im-
posed on various parties by ERISA). 
108 A surprisingly large number of such cases, especially cases concerning real estate 
sales, remain in our dataset. This is because many state statutes imposing liability for 
a failure to disclose also permit an informed waiver of the statute’s protection. In 
many of the real estate cases in our dataset, such a waiver was procured, leaving the 
parties to rely on common-law remedies. 
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First, if the court’s recitation of facts in a particular case did not 
permit the coding of every variable, we excluded the case from the 
dataset.109 However, when the recitation of facts contained suffi-
cient information to code each variable, we retained the case and 
coded for each variable, even if the court did not draw specific con-
clusions regarding each variable. To illustrate, we found that courts 
rarely specifically concluded whether the parties had equal access 
to information. However, the court’s recitation of facts generally 
allowed the case coder to make such a conclusion. This allowed us 
to test whether, as hypothesized by Professor Scheppele, equal ac-
cess to information significantly influenced case outcomes, even 
when the court purported to base its decision on other grounds 
and, in fact, may not have discussed the parties’ relative access to 
information at all.110 
Second, because our study spans numerous time frames and ju-
risdictions, it was simply impractical to master the specifics of the 
law with respect to each variable. This was especially true with re-
spect to the fiduciary duty variable. Instead, we adopted bright-line 
rules that reflected the general weight of authority across jurisdic-
tions and did not apply the fiduciary duty rules specific to the juris-
diction deciding the case.111 
Third, on rare occasions, the case coder may simply have dis-
agreed with the court’s characterization of a particular variable. In 
such cases, we directed the case coder to code the variable consis-
tent with our definitions of each variable, rather than the court’s 
conclusions. For example, even if a court concluded that a particu-
lar doctor-patient relationship was not confidential, our case coders 
would have coded such a relationship as fiduciary or confidential, 
because we adopted in advance a bright-line rule that all such rela-
tionships would be treated as confidential. Similarly, we directed 
our case coders to apply the bright-line definition we developed 
(based on Professor Kronman’s theories) for determining whether 
information was casually acquired, regardless of whether the court 
 
109 See Appendix, Section 2 (discussing the reasons that particular cases were ex-
cluded from the dataset). 
110 See Scheppele, supra note 2, at 133 (arguing that the common-law rule holding 
sellers to greater disclosure obligations than buyers is actually a rule of equal access 
because buyers are unlikely to have access to information unavailable to the seller). 
111 See supra Section I.B.1 (discussing the fiduciary duty variable). 
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determined the information in question was casually acquired.112 
This approach minimizes both subjectivity in coding and any judi-
cial tendency to characterize variables in a manner that supports 
the court’s ultimate ruling.113 
C. Summary Statistics 
Table 2 provides a short description of the variables related to 
case characteristics and summary statistics for the entire sample, 
for the sub-sample of cases requiring disclosure, and for the sub-
sample of cases not requiring disclosure. Table 3 provides the same 
information for variables related to decision date, geographic re-
gion, and jurisdiction. 
III. RESULTS 
The claims presented in Part I predict that the probability that a 
court will find a duty to disclose depends, in part, on five groups of 
factors: the type of information withheld by the informed party, the 
type of transaction in which the parties engaged, the way in which 
the information was acquired by the informed party, the character-
istics of the uninformed party, and the behavior of the informed 
party. In addition to these factors, we also investigate trends re-
lated to the decision date, geographic location of the court, and ju-
risdiction. 
Our dependent variable—DISCLOSURE—is dichotomous; 
therefore, linear regression models such as Ordinary Least Squares 
 
112 See supra Section I.C.1 (discussing the definition of casually acquired informa-
tion). It should be noted that, most often, the court either made no conclusion with 
respect to this variable or made a conclusion consistent with our own. However, on 
rare occasions when the court’s conclusion was inconsistent with our bright-line defi-
nition, the case coder was directed to ignore the court’s conclusion and apply our 
definition. 
113 Like all readers of judicial opinions, we are still limited by the court’s statement 
of facts. Our objective approach frees us only from the court’s erroneous conclusions 
regarding the facts, not from the statement of facts itself. See D’Amato, supra note 
101 (arguing that courts sometimes purposely misstate facts). In other words, if a 
court incorrectly reports that two bargaining parties were married, the case coders 
would treat the relationship as confidential, even if the court’s reporting of this fact 
was incorrect. In contrast, if the court correctly reported that the bargaining parties 
were married but then concluded that the relationship was not confidential, our case 
coders would disagree and treat the relationship as confidential. 
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are not appropriate to perform estimations.114 Instead, we employ 
logistic regressions to estimate the effects of our independent vari-
ables on the predicted log odds that a court will require disclo-
sure.115 Using regression analysis to measure the effects of the inde-
pendent variables on the predicted log odds that a court will 
require disclosure allows us to draw inferences about which factors 
significantly influence court decisions when other factors are taken 
into account. 
 
 
114 A dichotomous variable is one that can take on only one of two possible values. 
The variable DISCLOSURE is coded either as a “0” or a “1” for each observation in 
our sample. 
115 The dependent variable is the predicted log odds that the event will occur, rather 
than the probability that the event will occur, because the log odds form satisfies the 
assumptions required to obtain valid regression results. The coefficients generated 
when using this form as the dependent variable lack an intuitively meaningful scale of 
interpretation, however. Thus, when interpreting the results in the text that follows, 
we interpret a coefficient that is statistically significant and positive as indicating that 
the presence of the associated independent variable leads to an increase in the likeli-
hood that the court will require disclosure. See Gregory C. Sisk, Michael Heise & 
Andrew P. Morriss, Charting the Influences on the Judicial Mind: An Empirical Study 
of Judicial Reasoning, 73 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1377, 1431–32 n.230 (1998) (explaining the 
technical differences between Ordinary Least Squares and logit models). For an in-
troduction to logistic regression methodology, see generally Fred C. Pampel, Logistic 
Regression: A Primer (Sage Univ. Papers, Quantitative Applications in the Soc. Sci-
ences Series No. 7-132, 2000). 
2ND SUB_KRAWIECZEILERBOOK.DOC 11/17/2005  10:32:28 AM 
1838 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 91:1795 
Table 2 
Variable Descriptions and Summary Statistics 
Case Characteristics 
 
VARIABLE DEFINITION
Dependent Variable:
  DISCL 0.51 (238) 1 = court imposed liability for 
fraudulent silence
Independent Variables:
  Type of Information:
  INSTRINSIC 0.97 (452) 0.97 (230) 0.97 (222) 1 = information related to subject 
matter of transaction
  PERSONAL 0.09 (42) 0.05 (12) 0.13 (30) 1 = information concerned 
personal intentions or opinions
  LATENT 0.13 (60) 0.20 (48) 0.05 (12) 1 = information related to a latent 
defect
  INJURE 0.03 (12) 0.03 (8) 0.02 (4) 1 = information concerned a defect 
likely to cause bodily injury
  DAMAGE 0.08 (36) 0.10 (23) 0.06 (13) 1 = information concerned a defect 
likely to cause property damage
  UP_CORR 0.13 (62) 0.17 (41) 0.09 (21) 1 = information would have 
updated or corrected previously 
disclosed information
  Type of Transaction:
  CONFID 0.28 (131) 0.43 (102) 0.13 (29) 1 = parties to transaction in a 
confidential or fiduciary 
relationship
  INSURE 0.07 (32) 0.08 (20) 0.05 (12) 1 = transaction concerned 
acquisition of insurance
  RELEASE 0.03 (15) 0.04 (9) 0.03 (6) 1 = transaction concerned release 
from liability
  ACCESS 0.58 (268) 0.70 (165) 0.45 (103) 1 = parties had unequal access to 
information
  PROPERTY 0.34 (157) 0.41 (96) 0.27 (61) 1 = transaction concerned the 
transfer of real property
  SLAVE 0.01 (3) 0.01 (3) 0.00 (0) 1 = transaction concerned the 
transfer of a slave
  Type of Acquisition:
  CASUAL 0.80 (371) 0.80 (190) 0.79 (181) 1 = information was casually 
acquired
  ILLEGAL 0.01 (4) 0.01 (3) 0.004 (1) 1 = information was acquired 
through illegal or tortious means
DISCLOSURE DISCLOSURE
 (N = 229)
DUTY
FOR FULL
(N = 466)
FOR CASES
FINDING
 (N = 237)
SAMPLE DUTY
MEAN
MEAN FOR
CASES
FINDING NO
MEAN
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Table 2 (continued)  
 
VARIABLE DEFINITION
  BUYER 0.40 (186) 0.46 (109) 0.34 (77) 1 = uninformed party was the 
buyer or lessee
  FEMALE 0.12 (55) 0.14 (33) 0.10 (22) 1 = uninformed party was female
  SICK 0.06 (27) 0.08 (19) 0.03 (8) 1 = uninformed party was sick, 
disabled, illiterate or elderly
  LIED 0.20 (91) 0.35 (83) 0.03 (8) 1 = informed party made 
affirmative misrepresentations
  CONCEAL 0.08 (36) 0.14 (33) 0.01 (3) 1 = informed party concealed 
information
  HALF_TRUTH 0.23 (106) 0.37 (87) 0.08 (19) 1 = informed party told a half-truth
DISCLOSURE DISCLOSURE
 (N = 229)
DUTY
FOR FULL
(N = 466)
FOR CASES
FINDING
  Uninformed Party Characteristics:
  Informed Party Characteristics:
 (N = 237)
SAMPLE DUTY
MEAN
MEAN FOR
CASES
FINDING NO
MEAN
 
 
TABLE 2: This table provides a summary of the variables representing case characteristics em-
ployed in the empirical analysis along with the mean and description of each variable. The entire 
sample consists of 466 cases. The mean for each variable for the full sample can be interpreted as 
the percentage of cases characterized by the variable. For example, a mean of 51% for 
DISCLOSURE indicates that 51% of the cases held the informed party liable. The numbers in 
the parentheses indicate the number of cases (that is, mean times total number of cases in the 
sample). 
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Table 3 
Variable Descriptions and Summary Statistics 
Case Date, Geographic Region, and Jurisdiction 
 
VARIABLE DEFINITION
  YEAR 1961 1949 1973 year case was decided (range = [1793 , 2002])
  STATE 0.75 (348) 0.83 (197) 0.66 (151) 1 = case was decided by a state court
    CIR1 0.02 (8) 0.01 (3) 0.02 (5) 1 = case was decided by the First Circuit
    CIR2 0.05 (21) 0.02 (4) 0.07 (17) 1 = case was decided by the Second Circuit
    CIR3 0.02 (10) 0.01 (2) 0.03 (8) 1 = case was decided by the Third Circuit
    CIR4 0.02 (7) 0.02 (4) 0.01 (3) 1 = case was decided by the Fourth Circuit
    CIR5 0.02 (7) 0.01 (2) 0.02 (5) 1 = case was decided by the Fifth Circuit
    CIR6 0.02 (7) 0.004 (1) 0.03 (6) 1 = case was decided by the Sixth Circuit
    CIR7 0.02 (7) 0.01 (2) 0.02 (5) 1 = case was decided by the Seventh Circuit
    CIR8 0.03 (12) 0.02 (5) 0.03 (7) 1 = case was decided by the Eighth Circuit
    CIR9 0.03 (14) 0.03 (8) 0.03 (6) 1 = case was decided by the Ninth Circuit
    CIR10 0.02 (10) 0.02 (4) 0.03 (6) 1 = case was decided by the Tenth Circuit
    CIR11 0.01 (6) 0.00 (0) 0.03 (6) 1 = case was decided by the Eleventh Circuit
    FEDCIR 0.002 (1) 0.004 (1) 0.000 (0) 1 = case was decided by the Federal Circuit
    DCCIR 0.01 (3) 0.01 (2) 0.004 (1) 1 = case was decided by the D.C. Circuit
    WEST 0.14 (66) 0.16 (38) 0.12 (28) 1 = case was decided by a court in the West
    SOUTH 0.25 (117) 0.23 (55) 0.27 (61) 1 = case was decided by a court in the South
    MIDATLANTIC 0.23 (106) 0.24 (58) 0.21 (48) 1 = case was decided by a court in a Mid-Atlantic state
    SOUTHWEST 0.08 (36) 0.08 (18) 0.08 (18) 1 = case was decided by a court in the Southwest
    NEWENGLAND 0.07 (32) 0.06 (15) 0.07 (17) 1 = case was decided by a court in New England
    MIDWEST 0.24 (110) 0.22 (53) 0.25 (57) 1 = case was decided by a court in the Midwest
Additional Independent Variables:
  FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURTS
  GEOGRAPHIC REGIONS
FINDING NO
DISCLOSURE
SAMPLE DUTY DUTY
 (N = 229)
MEAN FOR
CASES
MEAN
FOR FULL
(N = 466)
MEAN
FOR CASES
FINDING
DISCLOSURE
 (N = 237)
 
 
TABLE 3: This table provides a summary of the variables representing case date, geographic 
region and jurisdiction employed in the empirical analysis along with the mean and description 
of each variable. The entire sample consists of 466 cases. The numbers in the parentheses indi-
cate the number of cases (that is, mean times total number of cases in the sample). 
 
Throughout this Part, it is important to note that all reported re-
sults are aggregate results and therefore do not reflect differences 
across jurisdictions. In other words, a reported result that a particu-
lar variable (for example, PROPERTY) is insignificant could mean 
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that the variable is truly an insignificant predictor of case outcomes 
in all jurisdictions. At the same time, however, it is possible that 
the variable’s effect on decisions is significant and positive in the 
First Circuit, canceling out the fact that it is significant and nega-
tive in the Second Circuit. Similarly, a reported result that a par-
ticular variable (for example, ACCESS) is positive and significant 
could mean that the variable is a significant predictor of case out-
comes in all jurisdictions or only a few. Indeed, it is possible that 
the variable’s effect is negative and slightly significant in only one 
or a few jurisdictions, but is counteracted by the variable’s highly 
significant positive impact in other jurisdictions. In other words, 
this project is designed to study overall general trends in decisions 
that correspond to claims made by legal scholars and economic his-
torians regarding general trends and patterns in the law governing 
fraudulent nondisclosure. We do not attempt to describe the law 
for any particular jurisdiction. 
Table 4 presents basic results for several logistic regression 
analyses that test the influence of various sets of independent vari-
ables on the likelihood that a court will find that the informed 
party owed a duty of disclosure to the uninformed party.116 Various 
specifications were analyzed to test the robustness of the results 
given the large number of independent variables included in the 
model.117 The following Sections provide a variable-by-variable 
analysis of the results derived from the regression analysis and 
various statistical tests. 
 
116 We also analyzed the data using probit analysis and obtained results that were 
nearly identical to the results we obtained using logistic regression analysis. For an 
explanation of how probit analysis differs from logistic regression analysis, see Pam-
pel, supra note 115, at 54–68. 
117 By “specification” we mean the construction of the empirical equation that we 
estimate to generate results regarding how the independent variables affect the de-
pendent variable. The process of specifying the model includes determining: (1) which 
variables should be included in the model, (2) the functional form of the model, and 
(3) the probabilistic assumptions made about the dependent variable, the independ-
ent variables, and the error term. A result is “robust” if it does not vary significantly 
with the specification of the model. 
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Table 4 
Maximum-Likelihood Logit Estimation Results 
Dependent Variable: Predicted log odds of court finding duty to disclose 
VARIABLE
Type of Information:
  INTRINSIC 0.32 0.16
(0.57) (0.86)
  PERSONAL - 0.93** - 0.32
(0.01) (0.56)
  LATENT 1.77*** 2.24***
(0.00) (0.00)
  INJURE 0.07 1.05
(0.92) (0.20)
  DAMAGE - 0.63 - 0.23
(0.18) (0.72)
  UP_CORR 0.90*** 1.06**
(0.00) (0.01)
Type of Transaction:
  CONFID 1.82*** 2.65***
(0.00) (0.00)
  INSURE 0.14 - 0.13
(0.77) (0.84)
  RELEASE 0.53 0.51
(0.39) (0.55)
  ACCESS 1.19*** 1.03***
(0.00) (0.00)
  PROPERTY 1.27*** 0.29
(0.00) (0.45)
Type of Acquisition:
  CASUAL 0.09 0.76*
(0.71) (0.06)
  ILLEGAL 1.10 1.26
(0.34) (0.46)
Uninformed Party Characteristics:
  BUYER 0.54** 1.18***
(0.01) (0.00)
  FEMALE 0.28 0.04
(0.36) (0.93)
  SICK 0.85* 1.58**
(0.06) (0.03)
Informed Party Characteristics:
  LIED 2.93*** 3.17***
(0.00) (0.00)
  CONCEAL 2.82*** 3.15***
(0.00) (0.00)
  HALF_TRUTH 2.18*** 2.81***
(0.00) (0.00)
Constant -0.47 -1.60*** -0.04 -0.26** -1.01*** -4.41***
(0.40) (0.00) (0.84) (0.04) (0.00) (0.00)
LR χ2 42.22 109.37 1.12 13.50 178.01 310.58
(0.00) (0.00) (0.57) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Pseudo R2 0.07 0.17 0.00 0.02 0.28 0.48
N 466 463 466 466 466 463
COEFFICIENT
(P VALUE)
 
 
* p < 0.10  
** p < 0 .05  
*** p < 0 .01 
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TABLE 4: This table provides the maximum-likelihood logit estimation results for the effects of 
case characteristics on whether the court found a duty to disclose. These results do not include 
the effects of the decision date or the geographic location and jurisdiction of the court. See Table 
6 for results taking these characteristics into account. 
 
Note: LR 2 indicates the result from testing the null hypothesis that all coefficients in the model, 
except the constant, equal zero. In addition, it should be noted that, although pseudo R2 statistics 
provide a quick way to compare the fit of different models for the same dependent variable, they 
lack the straightforward explained-variance interpretation of true R2 in OLS regressions. 
A. The Type of Information 
Recall that commentators have suggested that particular charac-
teristics of the withheld information influence courts’ decisions in 
fraudulent silence cases. These characteristics include whether the 
information was intrinsic or extrinsic in nature, related to personal 
intentions or opinions versus facts, related to latent or patent de-
fects, concerned a defect likely to cause bodily injury or property 
damage, and would have updated or corrected previously disclosed 
information.118 
1. Whether the information was intrinsic, as opposed to extrinsic or 
market, information does not explain the variation in outcomes 
because 97% of the cases in the sample involve intrinsic information 
a. General Results 
We hypothesized that cases involving intrinsic information are 
more likely to result in a finding that the informed party owed a 
disclosure duty to the uninformed party in early years, but that the 
importance of the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction disappears over 
time.119 
As the results displayed in Table 4 indicate, the coefficient on 
INTRINSIC is not statistically different from zero (p > 0.10), indi-
cating that the intrinsic nature of the information is not a factor 
that helps to explain the variation in case outcomes.120 It should be 
 
118 See supra Section I.A. 
119 See supra Section I.A.1 (discussing assertions by courts and commentators re-
garding extrinsic information). 
120 To test the statistical significance of any result, a test statistic is calculated (the 
details of which are unimportant for purposes of this exposition). The p-value is in-
terpreted as the probability of observing a test statistic as extreme or more extreme 
than the computed test statistic assuming the null hypothesis is true (for example, the 
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noted, however, that this result is driven by the fact that 97% of the 
cases in the full sample involve intrinsic, rather than extrinsic, in-
formation. 
Nonetheless, other statistical tests allow us to cast some doubt 
on the conventional wisdom regarding the relative likelihood that 
courts will require the disclosure of intrinsic information. Specifi-
cally, tests for the equality of proportions cast doubt on claims that 
courts are more likely to require the disclosure of intrinsic informa-
tion than extrinsic information. Of the 14 cases in our dataset in-
volving extrinsic information, the court found the existence of a 
duty to disclose in 6 of the cases (or 43%). On the other hand, 51% 
of the cases (or 231 of 452) involving intrinsic information resulted 
in a finding that the informed party owed the uninformed party a 
duty to disclose. Our analysis thus reveals that courts are not statis-
tically more likely to require the disclosure of intrinsic information 
as opposed to extrinsic information (p = 0.28). 
Moreover, an interesting question here is why so few cases in-
volving extrinsic information result in judicial decisions. Appar-
ently, cases involving extrinsic information are either more likely 
to settle, or less likely to be brought by plaintiffs. One possible ex-
planation is that plaintiffs are simply less likely to bring claims for 
fraudulent silence when the withheld information is extrinsic, 
rather than intrinsic. This conjecture is supported by two potential 
explanations. First, it is possible that individuals are less likely to 
possess extrinsic information unknown to their bargaining partners 
as compared to intrinsic information. Second, the uninformed 
party is unlikely to discover that the informed party knew of ex-
trinsic information. For example, it is unlikely that a home buyer 
would discover that the seller had access to nonpublic information 
regarding the fact that a highway was going to be built across an 
adjacent lot. By contrast, the uninformed party may be able to eas-
 
coefficient on INTRINSIC equals zero). “Extreme” means in the direction of the al-
ternative hypothesis (for example, the coefficient on INTRINSIC is different from 
zero). In this case, assuming the null hypothesis is true, the chance of observing a test 
statistic as or more extreme than the computed test statistic is greater than 10%. This 
means that, at a confidence level of 10%, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the 
coefficient is equal to zero. Customarily, in social science research, a null hypothesis is 
rejected in favor of an alternative hypothesis if the p-value is less than 5% (in some 
cases, a 10% cutoff is used). In all cases, we report the exact p-values derived from the 
statistical tests, leaving readers to evaluate the strength of the evidence. 
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ily surmise that someone selling a car that she has owned for many 
years was aware that the engine fails to start in cold weather. 
b. Interaction Effects 
Recall from Part I that some commentators assert that some 
other factor, rather than the intrinsic nature of the information, ac-
tually explains the variation in fraudulent silence cases. For exam-
ple, Professor W. Page Keeton argues that, although courts require 
the disclosure of intrinsic information more frequently than extrin-
sic information, it is really the lack of equal access to intrinsic in-
formation relative to extrinsic information that is driving case out-
comes.121 Similarly, Keeton argues that the intrinsic/extrinsic 
distinction fails to explain case outcomes when the uninformed 
party is the purchaser, as opposed to the seller.122 Finally, Professor 
Anthony Kronman asserts that it is really the fact that extrinsic in-
formation is typically deliberately acquired that drives case out-
comes, rather than the mere fact that the information is extrinsic.123 
To test these claims, we ran three separate regressions to deter-
mine if interaction effects are present between INTRINSIC and 
the three variables ACCESS, CASUAL, and BUYER.124 The re-
sults suggest that there are no significant interaction effects be-
tween INTRINSIC and these three variables. This result, however, 
is most likely due to the lack of variation in the INTRINSIC vari-
able and the resulting collinearity125 between the interaction term 
and the variables ACCESS, CASUAL, and BUYER. 
 
121 See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
122 See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
123 See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
124 By including interaction effects in the analysis, we are able to measure the 
amount of change in the slope of the regression of the dependent variable, say Y, on 
an independent variable, say X, when a second independent variable, say Z, changes 
by one unit. A positive and significant coefficient on an interaction term, X * Z, im-
plies that the higher the X, the greater the effect of Z on Y. Similarly, the higher the 
Z, the greater the effect of X on Y. 
125 Two variables are collinear if they are highly correlated. When two independent 
variables are highly correlated, they both introduce essentially the same information 
into the regression. This violates one of the necessary assumptions of the logit model. 
In addition, collinearity in this case implies that the interaction term has very little 
variation and, therefore, is not likely to be a significant factor in explaining the varia-
tion in outcomes. 
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c. Time Trends 
Recall that some commentators claim that courts, over time, put 
less weight on whether the information is intrinsic or extrinsic, and 
instead focus on other factors.126 To test claims about the influence 
of intrinsic information over time, we tabulated the number of 
cases that involved intrinsic information and in which the court 
found a duty to disclose during three periods: 1793–1899, 1900–
1949, and 1950–2002.127 Table 5 presents the results from this tabu-
lation. 
 
Table 5 
Tabulations for Cases Involving Intrinsic Information 
 
PERIOD
COURT FOUND 
DUTY TO 
DISCLOSE
COURT FOUND NO 
DUTY TO 
DISCLOSE
1793–1899 33 (77%) 10 (23%)
1900–1949 72 (70%) 31 (30%)
1950–2002 126 (41%) 180 (59%)  
 
TABLE 5: This table presents the results of tabulations of the number of cases involving intrin-
sic information by outcome for three periods: 1793–1899, 1900–1949, and 1950–2002. 
 
Tests for the equality of proportions were performed to investi-
gate the claim that, over time, courts place less emphasis on 
whether the information was intrinsic or extrinsic.128 First, we tested 
whether courts impose disclosure duties in a statistically signifi-
 
126 See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
127 These periods were chosen arbitrarily. The results do not vary, however, if differ-
ent periods are used to test the hypothesis. 
128 In particular, we ran two-sample, one-sided tests on the equality of proportions 
(calculated using the data from two distinct samples). These tests pit the null hypothe-
sis of equal proportions against an alternative hypothesis that one proportion is statis-
tically significantly greater than the other, controlling for sample size. If the null hy-
pothesis is accepted over the alternative hypothesis, then one may conclude that the 
difference in proportions is due to chance. 
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cantly lower proportion of cases involving intrinsic information 
during the period 1793–1899 than in the period 1900–1949. The re-
sult indicates that no statistically significant difference exists be-
tween the percentages (p = 0.20). However, the proportion of cases 
involving intrinsic information in which the court found a duty to 
disclose during the period 1900–1949 was statistically significantly 
higher than the proportion of such cases during the period 1950–
2002 (p = 0.00). Therefore, the data do show some support for the 
claim that factors other than whether the information was intrinsic 
or extrinsic became more important to courts over time. This 
alone, however, does not allow us to determine whether this trend 
is due to the relatively greater emphasis courts place on the nature 
of the information as intrinsic versus extrinsic, or the general de-
crease over time in the likelihood that courts will find a duty to dis-
close.129 
2. Whether the information involves personal intentions or opinions, 
as opposed to facts, does not explain the variation in case outcomes 
because the number of cases involving such information is too small 
to obtain useful results from regression analysis. Outcome counts, 
however, cast doubt on the conventional wisdom relating to personal 
intentions. 
Recall that there is almost universal agreement among commen-
tators that the disclosure of personal intentions or opinions is not 
required by the common law.130 The results presented in Table 4 
indicate that the coefficient on PERSONAL is significant and 
negative (p = 0.01) when we control only for variables relating to 
the type of information. When we control for all case characteris-
 
129 In theory, it is possible to control for the general trend over time and other influ-
ences on court decisions, by estimating the influence of intrinsic information over 
time using a logistic regression that includes the twenty variables representing case 
characteristics and YEAR, together with a term to capture the interaction of year and 
intrinsic information (INTRINSIC * YEAR). The coefficient on the interaction term 
would allow us to determine whether courts were more or less likely to require disclo-
sure in cases involving intrinsic information in later years relative to earlier years. The 
coefficient on the interaction term was not statistically significantly different from 
zero (p = 0.67). Due to the lack of variation in the INTRINSIC variable, however, this 
regression result does not provide us with any useful information. See supra note 120 
and accompanying text (discussing problems arising from the fact that 97% of the 
cases involve intrinsic information). 
130 See supra Section I.A.2. 
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tics, however, the coefficient loses significance.131 When all vari-
ables are included in the model, the coefficient on PERSONAL is 
insignificant (p > 0.10), indicating that whether the information is a 
personal opinion or intention versus a fact is not a factor that helps 
to explain the variation in case outcomes. This result most likely is 
driven by the fact that only 9% of the cases in the full sample in-
volve personal intentions or opinions. The number of these sorts of 
cases might be too small to accurately identify the effect of this 
variable on the likelihood of mandated disclosure. 
Nonetheless, simple outcome counts cast doubt on the conven-
tional wisdom relating to the disclosure of personal intentions or 
opinions. Recall that consensus on the theory that the common law 
does not require the disclosure of personal intentions or opinions is 
so widespread that we hypothesized, first, that very few such cases 
are actually brought and, second, that when such cases do result in 
a decision the court nearly always permits such information to be 
withheld. While we note that simple counts do not control for the 
effects of other variables of interest and therefore results obtained 
from simple counts must be viewed with this limitation in mind, the 
results of the outcome count do not support either prediction re-
garding personal intentions or opinions. Of the 466 cases in the 
sample, 41 (or 9%) involve information that was personal in na-
ture.132 In a substantial portion of these cases (12 of the 41), the 
court ruled that the informed party had a duty to disclose the with-
held opinion or intention. Given the strong agreement among 
 
131 Adding controls allows us to determine whether an observed correlation between 
a particular factor, such as whether the information involves personal intentions or 
opinions, and the probability that the court imposes a duty to disclose might be at-
tributable to some other factor that possibly is correlated with the variable 
PERSONAL. For example, if a particular factor, such as whether the information is 
intrinsic, increases the probability that the court will find a duty to disclose and this 
factor is highly (but not perfectly) correlated with whether the information involves 
personal intentions or opinions, then including the variable INTRINSIC in the regres-
sion allows it to untangle the influences of INTRINSIC AND PERSONAL on the 
likelihood that the court will impose a disclosure duty. 
132 We can rule out the possibility that the lack of cases is attributable to courts’ re-
luctance to impose liability for failure to disclose personal intentions or opinions in 
early cases, causing plaintiffs to eventually abandon such claims. Cases involving per-
sonal intentions or opinions appeared in the dataset uniformly over time. The first 
case of this sort was decided in 1852, five others were decided prior to 1950, and the 
remaining cases were decided after 1950. 
2ND SUB_KRAWIECZEILERBOOK.DOC 11/17/2005  10:32:28 AM 
2005] Disclosure Duties and the Sin of Omission 1849 
commentators that the disclosure of opinions and personal inten-
tions is not required, these results are surprising. We conclude that 
even the limited number of cases in our dataset involving informa-
tion of this type challenges the conventional wisdom regarding the 
disclosure of opinions and intentions. 
3. Courts are significantly more likely to require disclosure when the 
withheld information relates to a latent defect. 
We hypothesized that courts would be more likely to require 
disclosure when the informed party withholds information relating 
to a latent defect.133 The results presented in Table 4 support this 
claim. The coefficient on LATENT is positive and highly signifi-
cant (p = 0.00), even when we control for all variables relating to 
case characteristics. The commentators appear to have correctly 
argued that this factor significantly influences judicial decisions in 
fraudulent silence cases. 
4. Whether the undisclosed information would likely cause bodily 
injury or property damage does not explain the variation in the case 
outcomes, most likely because the number of cases involving such 
information is too small to obtain useful results from regression 
analysis. Outcome counts, however, suggest that our hypotheses 
regarding information of this sort are not supported strongly by the 
data. 
We hypothesized that the withholding of information likely to 
cause physical injury or property damage increases the likelihood 
of court-mandated disclosure.134 We coded cases separately for in-
formation concerning a defect likely to cause bodily injury 
(INJURE) and information concerning a defect likely to cause 
property damage (DAMAGE). The results presented in Table 4 
indicate that the coefficients on INJURE and DAMAGE are in-
significant (p > 0.10 in all cases). We note, however, that very few 
cases involving information of this sort were present in our dataset. 
Only 3% of the cases included in the full sample involve informa-
tion likely to cause bodily injury and 8% of the cases involve in-
formation likely to lead to property damage. Therefore, the num-
 
133 See supra Section I.A.3. 
134 See supra Section I.A.4. 
2ND SUB_KRAWIECZEILERBOOK.DOC 11/17/2005  10:32:28 AM 
1850 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 91:1795 
ber of these sorts of cases might be too small to accurately identify 
the effect of these variables on the likelihood of mandated disclo-
sure. 
Again we performed simple counts, the results of which shed 
light on whether courts are more likely to require disclosure of in-
formation regarding defects likely to cause physical injury or prop-
erty damage. The results do not support our hypothesis that courts 
are more likely to require disclosure of this sort of information. Of 
the 12 cases involving information likely to result in physical injury, 
8 (or 67%) resulted in a finding that the informed party had a duty 
to disclose, while 4 (or 33%) resulted in a finding that the informed 
party did not have a duty to disclose. Likewise, in 64% of cases (or 
23 of 36) involving information likely to result in property damage, 
the court found a duty to disclose. On the other hand, courts re-
quired disclosure in about 50% (or 443 of 884) of cases not involv-
ing such information. While these results suggest that courts tend 
to rule for the uninformed party more often when bodily injury or 
property damage is involved, these case outcomes are not nearly as 
striking as one might expect, given the statements of legal com-
mentators. 
As with the INTRINSIC variable, an interesting question here is 
why so few decisions involve information that could prevent bodily 
injury or property damage. One possibility is that these cases settle, 
because the plaintiff (who, by definition, has suffered bodily injury 
or property damage) seems sympathetic and the defendant’s be-
havior appears more egregious in comparison. In addition, it might 
be that cases of this sort give rise to other claims, such as negli-
gence, and lawyers representing injured parties simply might not 
include additional claims for fraudulent silence. For example, a 
manufacturer’s failure to disclose certain defects is actionable un-
der state statutes related to products liability. Finally, it is possible 
that failures to disclose information regarding defects likely to lead 
to injuries or property damage simply occur with lower frequency 
than nondisclosures of other types of information. Obviously, we 
cannot test this conjecture using our data. 
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5. Courts are significantly more likely to require disclosure when the 
withheld information would have updated or corrected previously 
disclosed information. 
We hypothesized that courts would be more likely to require 
disclosure when the undisclosed information would have updated 
or corrected previously disclosed information.135 The results pre-
sented in Table 4 support this claim. The coefficient on UP_CORR 
is positive and highly significant (p = 0.01) when we control for all 
variables relating to case characteristics. In this case it appears that 
the commentators have argued correctly that this factor signifi-
cantly influences courts’ decisions in fraudulent silence cases. 
B. The Type of Transaction 
Recall that commentators have argued that the type of transac-
tion in question influences courts’ decisions in fraudulent silence 
cases. In particular, claims have been made that courts are more 
likely to require disclosure in transactions between parties in a con-
fidential or fiduciary relationship; transactions concerning the ac-
quisition of insurance, surety, or a release from liability; transac-
tions in which the parties have unequal access to information; 
transactions concerning the transfer of real property; and transac-
tions concerning the sale or transfer of a slave.136 
1. Courts are significantly more likely to require disclosure when the 
contracting parties are in a confidential or fiduciary relationship. 
We hypothesized that courts would be more likely to require 
disclosure when the contracting parties are in a confidential or fi-
duciary relationship.137 The results presented in Table 4 support this 
claim. The coefficient on CONFID is positive and highly significant 
(p = 0.00), even when we control for all variables relating to case 
characteristics. In this case it appears that the commentators have 
correctly argued that, when the parties are in a confidential or fi-
duciary relationship, courts are more likely to require disclosure. 
 
135 See supra Section I.A.5. 
136 See supra Section I.B. 
137 See supra Section I.B.1. 
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2. Whether the transaction concerned insurance or a release from 
liability does not explain the variation in case outcomes, most likely 
because the number of cases involving such a transaction is too 
small to obtain useful results from regression analysis. Outcome 
counts, however, suggest that our hypotheses regarding information 
of this sort are not supported strongly by the data. 
We hypothesized that decisions involving transactions related to 
insurance, surety, or a release from liability were more likely to re-
sult in the imposition of disclosure duties.138 We coded 
INSURANCE and RELEASE separately. Because only one case 
in our sample involved surety, we coded it as an insurance case. 
The independent variable INSURE therefore represents cases re-
lated to insurance and one case related to surety. RELEASE 
represents cases related to releases from liability. 
The results presented in Table 4 indicate that the coefficients on 
INSURE and RELEASE are insignificant (p > 0.10 in all cases). 
We note again, however, that there are very few decisions involv-
ing information of this sort. Only 7% of the cases included in the 
full sample involve insurance transactions and only 3% of the cases 
involve releases from liability. Therefore, the number of these sorts 
of cases might be too small to accurately identify the effect of these 
variables on the likelihood of mandated disclosure. 
Again, we used simple outcome counts to determine whether 
courts are more likely to require disclosure of information when 
the transaction involves insurance or a release from liability. The 
results do not support our hypothesis that courts are more likely to 
require disclosure of this sort of information. Of the 32 cases in-
volving insurance contracts, the court found a duty to disclose in 20 
(or 63%). Likewise, courts found a duty to disclose in 9 of 15 cases 
(or 60%) involving releases from liability. Therefore, while courts 
tend to find a duty to disclose in a somewhat slight majority of 
cases involving insurance or releases from liability, courts do not 
force disclosure in an overwhelming number of such cases. 
3. Courts are significantly more likely to require disclosure when the 
transaction was one in which the parties had unequal access to 
information. Our analysis, however, indicates that the presence of 
 
138 See supra Section I.B.2. 
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unequal access in combination with the casual acquisition of 
information actually drives case outcomes. 
Recall from Part I that one of the liveliest debates in this litera-
ture is whether unequal access to information has a significant in-
fluence on the probability that courts will require the disclosure of 
material information.139 Of particular interest has been the debate 
between proponents of the equal access theory and proponents of 
the deliberately acquired information theory.140 The results reveal 
that if the parties had unequal access to the undisclosed informa-
tion, courts are more likely to find that the informed party had a 
duty to disclose. The coefficient on ACCESS is positive and highly 
significant (p = 0.00), even when we control for all variables relat-
ing to case characteristics. 
To ensure fair testing of the equal access theory we ran two addi-
tional regressions. First, Professor Scheppele’s assertions about the 
state of the law were published in 1988. Accordingly, if changes in 
the law caused courts to decide fraudulent silence cases differently 
after 1988, a regression on our full dataset might fail to support the 
equal access theory, even if Scheppele’s assertions were correct 
when made. To test this possibility, we ran a second regression us-
ing only cases decided from 1793 to 1987. Under this specification, 
the coefficient on ACCESS remains positive and highly significant 
(p = 0.008; n = 264). 
Second, it is possible that Professor Scheppele actually was re-
porting a perceived trend in the law based on a reading of several 
recent, important cases that she believed signaled a development in 
existing law. If this is the case, then a regression on cases decided 
up to the date of her statements would not pick up that trend, as 
the small number of recent, important cases would be outweighed 
by the larger number of older cases decided under the prior rule of 
law. To test this possibility we ran a third regression using only 
cases decided from 1989 to 2002. Under this specification, the coef-
ficient on ACCESS is insignificant (p = 0.17; n = 190), indicating 
 
139 See supra Section I.B.3. 
140 Compare Scheppele, supra note 2, at 124 (arguing that outcomes in fraudulent 
silence cases are best explained by the equal access theory), with Kronman, supra 
note 1, at 2 (arguing that outcomes in fraudulent silence cases are best explained by 
the fact that some information is casually acquired and some information is deliber-
ately acquired). 
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that, in later cases, unequal access to information is not a driving 
force behind decisions on the duty element. Therefore, our data do 
not support the possibility that Scheppele was reporting a per-
ceived trend or change in the law. 
Our results thus shed light on this long-standing debate and, at 
least initially, lend some support to the proponents of the equal ac-
cess theory. Particularly when viewed in light of the results on 
cases involving casually acquired information,141 our analysis seems 
to support the equal access proponents as opposed to those who 
claim that judges primarily consider economic efficiency in decid-
ing case outcomes. 
Because Professor Scheppele relied on many of the same cases 
employed by Professor Kronman to develop her theory, we 
thought it probable that both unequal access and casually acquired 
information were present in those cases requiring disclosure that 
the two authors examined. In other words, we surmised that both 
Kronman and Scheppele may have looked at a particular set of 
cases in which disclosure was required, the information was casu-
ally acquired, and the parties had unequal access. Whereas Kron-
man concluded that the casually acquired nature of the information 
drove case outcomes, Scheppele concluded that it was the unequal 
access of the parties that affected case outcomes. In contrast, we 
hypothesized that perhaps it is the presence of unequal access and 
casually acquired information together, rather than either factor 
separately, that actually drives case outcomes. 
To test this claim, we used a logistic regression and included all 
twenty variables representing case characteristics and an interac-
tion term, CASUAL * ACCESS.142 When we include this interac-
tion term, we find that the coefficient on the interaction term is sta-
tistically significant and positive (p = 0.04). At the same time, the 
 
141 See infra Section III.C. 
142 The variable ACCESS and the interaction term (CASUAL * ACCESS) are 
strongly positively correlated (r = 0.80). Therefore, we checked for problems related 
to multicollinearity. When we regress ACCESS on all the other independent variables 
and CASUAL * ACCESS, the tolerance is equal to 0.19. This means that 19% of the 
variation in the ACCESS variable is not explained by the other independent vari-
ables. We get a similar measure of tolerance when we regress the interaction term on 
all the independent variables. Tolerances of 5% or less are cause for concern. Thus, 
we are confident that our results are not significantly affected by multicollinearity. 
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coefficients on CASUAL and ACCESS both become insignificant 
(p = 0.86 and p = 0.72, respectively). 
These results suggest that courts are more likely to find a duty to 
disclose when both of these factors are present, but not when ei-
ther is present alone. Accordingly, our analysis indicates that each 
side of this heated debate is both right and wrong at the same time. 
Although whether the parties to the transaction had equal access 
to information and whether the informed party casually acquired 
the information both impact the probability that a court will man-
date disclosure, as suggested by participants in the debate, only the 
presence of both factors together significantly impacts case out-
comes. 
4. Whether the transaction involved the transfer of real property does 
not explain the variation in case outcomes when we control for all 
case characteristics. 
As we discussed in Part I, some commentators claim that courts 
are more likely to require disclosure when the transaction involves 
the transfer of real property.143 The results presented in Table 4 in-
dicate that the coefficient on PROPERTY is highly significant and 
positive (p = 0.00) when we control only for variables relating to 
the type of transaction. When we control for all case characteris-
tics, however, the coefficient loses significance. When all variables 
related to case characteristics are included in the model the coeffi-
cient on PROPERTY becomes insignificant (p > 0.10), indicating 
that courts’ decisions in cases involving the transfer of real prop-
erty are actually driven by other variables that are present in these 
sorts of cases. 
To test the most obvious potential variables driving the real 
property cases, we ran two logistic regressions that included all 
twenty variables related to case characteristics and an interac-
tion term for either PROPERTY * LATENT or PROPERTY * 
BUYER. In both cases, the interaction term was insignificant, 
meaning that neither LATENT nor BUYER drives the outcomes 
in property cases. Additional research is required to understand 
the interactions between PROPERTY and the other variables. 
 
143 See supra Section I.B.4. 
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5. Three cases involving the sale or transfer of a slave appear in the 
dataset, and in each case the court found that the informed party had 
a duty to disclose. We dropped the variable SLAVE from the 
regression analysis because it is a perfect predictor of case outcome. 
Although we predicted in Part I that courts are more likely to 
impose disclosure duties in cases involving the sale or transfer of a 
slave,144 we were not able to test this claim using regression analysis 
to control for the effects of other case characteristics because 
SLAVE is a perfect predictor of whether the court required disclo-
sure. In all three cases involving the sale or transfer of a slave, the 
court held that the informed party had a duty to disclose. There-
fore, although only three cases in our sample involve the sale or 
transfer of a slave, the fact that all three require disclosure is at 
least consistent with claims by some commentators that courts vigi-
lantly police such transactions. 
C. How the Information Was Acquired 
As discussed in Part I, commentators also argue that the method 
the informed party used to acquire the undisclosed information in-
fluences the likelihood that courts will impose a duty to disclose on 
parties to a transaction. In particular, commentators have argued 
that courts more frequently require the disclosure of casually ac-
quired information and information acquired through illegal or tor-
tious means.145 
1. The results provide very weak support, if any, for the claim that 
courts are more likely to require the disclosure of casually, as 
opposed to deliberately, acquired information. Our analysis, 
however, indicates that, if the parties lacked equal access to the 
information and the information was acquired casually, courts are 
more likely to require disclosure.146 
a. General Results 
Recall from Part I that Professor Kronman contends that courts 
hesitate to require the disclosure of information deliberately ac-
 
144 See supra Section I.B.5. 
145 See supra Section I.C. 
146 See supra note 142 and accompanying text (discussing the interaction of 
ACCESS with CASUAL). 
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quired by the informed party.147 We predicted that, although distin-
guishing between deliberately acquired and casually acquired in-
formation is difficult in practice, the presence of this factor influ-
ences courts to find a duty to disclose in fraudulent silence cases. 
The results presented in Table 4 are mixed on this factor. When 
we control only for factors relating to how the information was ac-
quired, the coefficient on CASUAL is insignificant (p = 0.71). 
When we control for all case characteristics, however, the coeffi-
cient becomes positive and weakly significant (p = 0.06), suggesting 
that courts might be more likely to require disclosure when the in-
formation is casually acquired as opposed to deliberately acquired. 
It is important to note here that the result related to this variable 
is not robust to other specifications that include variables for the 
year in which the case was decided, the geographic region in which 
the court sits, and the jurisdiction of the court.148 As presented in 
Table 6, when we control for the case characteristics and (1) the 
decision year, or (2) the geographic region, or (3) whether the 
court is a state or federal court, the coefficient on CASUAL re-
mains positive and weakly significant (0.10 > p > 0.05). When we 
control for (1) the case characteristics together with the circuit in 
which the court sits, or (2) all independent variables that we coded, 
however, the coefficient on CASUAL becomes insignificant 
(p > 0.10). These results indicate that the explanatory power of 
CASUAL is not robust to changes in the specification, which sug-
gests that any possible influence of CASUAL on the likelihood 
that the court will impose a duty to disclose is weak at best. 
 To ensure a fair test of Professor Kronman’s claims, we ran two 
additional regressions. First, Kronman developed his theory based 
on an examination of the law in 1978. As a result, if a change in the 
law of fraudulent silence caused courts to decide cases differently 
after 1978, then a regression on the full dataset could unfairly re-
ject Kronman’s hypothesis. Accordingly, we ran a second regres-
sion using only cases decided prior to the publication of his theory,  
 
 
 
147 See supra notes 65–75 and accompanying text (discussing the Kronman theory). 
As previously noted, Professor Kronman limits his claims to socially productive in-
formation, a distinction that we find irrelevant for the purposes of this study. See su-
pra note 65 (discussing this fact). 
148 General results for specifications including these additional variables are pre-
sented infra in Sections III.F and III.G.  
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Table 6 
Maximum-Likelihood Logit Estimation Results Including Year, Region, and Jurisdiction 
Dependent Variable: Predicted Log Odds of Court Finding Duty to Disclose 
Type of Information:   INTRINSIC 0.16 0.49 - 0.04 0.12 - 0.23 0.13
(0.86) (0.60) (0.96) (0.90) (0.82) (0.99)
  PERSONAL - 0.32 - 0.22 - 0.30 - 0.18 - 0.35 - 0.29
(0.56) (0.69) (0.60) (0.76) (0.56) (0.63)
  LATENT 2.24*** 2.09*** 2.37*** 2.23*** 2.34*** 2.27***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
  INJURE 1.05 0.93 1.16 1.28 1.41 1.27
(0.20) (0.27) (0.17) (0.13) (0.13) (0.19)
  DAMAGE - 0.23 0.03 - 0.27 - 0.16 - 0.29 - 0.14
(0.72) (0.97) (0.69) (0.81) (0.68) (0.84)
  UP_CORR 1.06** 1.12** 1.13** 1.14** 1.26** 1.29**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Type of Transaction:   CONFID 2.65*** 2.42*** 2.84*** 2.50*** 2.68*** 2.70***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
  INSURE - 0.13 - 0.24 - 0.01 - 0.11 - 0.21 - 0.23
(0.84) (0.71) (0.99) (0.86) (0.76) (0.75)
  RELEASE 0.51 0.47 0.51 0.38 0.36 0.35
(0.55) (0.57) (0.58) (0.65) (0.68) (0.70)
  ACCESS 1.03*** 1.05*** 1.03*** 1.11*** 1.24*** 1.20***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
  PROPERTY 0.29 0.26 0.33 0.12 - 0.13 - 0.04
(0.45) (0.50) (0.40) (0.77) (0.76) (0.92)
Type of Acquisition:   CASUAL 0.76* 0.72* 0.81* 0.67* 0.53 0.52
(0.06) (0.07) (0.05) (0.09) (0.21) (0.23)
  ILLEGAL 1.26 0.99 0.75 1.26 0.84 0.16
(0.46) (0.55) (0.66) (0.44) (0.66) (0.93)
Uninformed   BUYER 1.18*** 1.25*** 1.33*** 1.20*** 1.53*** 1.72***
Party (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Characteristics:   FEMALE 0.04 0.03 0.20 - 0.04 - 0.02 0.17
(0.93) (0.94) (0.67) (0.93) (0.97) (0.74)
  SICK 1.58** 1.42* 1.66** 1.58** 1.72** 1.56*
(0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.06)
Informed   LIED 3.17*** 3.17*** 3.22*** 3.23*** 3.49*** 3.52***
Party (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Characteristics:   CONCEAL 3.15*** 3.32*** 3.31*** 3.27*** 3.44*** 3.65***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
  HALF_TRUTH 2.81*** 2.69*** 2.87*** 2.73*** 2.91*** 2.88***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Time Trend:   YEAR - 0.01** - 0.01*
(0.01) (0.08)
Geographic Region:   WEST 0.68 0.45
(0.17) (0.42)
  SOUTH 0.19 0.20
(0.67) (0.69)
  MID-ATLANTIC 1.13** 0.97*
(0.01) (0.07)
  SOUTHWEST 1.35** 1.22*
(0.03) (0.07)
  NEW ENGLAND 0.67 0.58
(0.26) (0.37)
Jurisdiction:   STATE 0.75** - 1.39
(0.04) (0.28)
  3RD CIRCUIT - 1.20 - 2.86*
(0.26) (0.08)
  6TH CIRCUIT - 3.20** - 4.70**
(0.02) (0.02)
  7TH CIRCUIT - 2.90** - 3.74**
(0.02) (0.05)
Controls for all circuits included † YES YES
Constant -4.41*** 13.55* -5.03*** -4.84*** -3.86*** 11.09
(0.00) (0.06) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.19)
LR χ2 310.58 317.23 321.20 314.91 325.54 337.22
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Pseudo R2 0.48 0.49 0.50 0.49 0.52 0.53
N 463 463 463 463 456 456
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES (P VALUE)
COEFFICIENT
 
* p < 0.10; ** p <0.05; *** p < 0.01 
† Only those circuits for which results are statistically significant at the 10% level appear in the table. 
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TABLE 6: This table provides the maximum-likelihood logit estimation results for the effects of 
case characteristics, including the decision date, geographic location of the court (Midwest used 
as base) and jurisdiction of the court, on whether the court found a duty to disclose. 
 
Note: LR χ2 indicates the result from testing the null hypothesis that all coefficients in the 
model, except the constant, equal zero. In addition, it should be noted that, although pseudo R2 
statistics provide a quick way to compare the fit of different models for the same dependent 
variable, they lack the straightforward explained-variance interpretation of true R2 in OLS re-
gression. 
 
from 1793 to 1977. In this specification, which controls only for the 
case characteristics and not year of decision, jurisdiction, or geo-
graphic region, the coefficient on CASUAL remains positive and 
weakly significant (p = 0.08; n = 204). 
Second, Professor Kronman actually may have been reporting a 
perceived trend or change in the law based on the outcomes of a 
few recently decided, important cases that he believed signaled a 
change in existing law. If this is true, then a regression on cases de-
cided up to the time Kronman made his statements would not pick 
up this trend, because the many older cases following the prior rule 
of law would obscure the impact of the more recent, important 
cases asserting a new rule of law. To test this possibility, we ran a 
regression using only cases decided after the publication of his the-
ory, from 1979 to 2002. In this specification, again controlling only 
for case characteristics, the coefficient on CASUAL becomes in-
significant (p = 0.22; n = 255), indicating that whether the informa-
tion was casually, rather than deliberately, acquired has no signifi 
cant influence on whether the court finds a duty to disclose in the 
later cases. Therefore, our data do not support the claim that 
Kronman was reporting a perceived trend or change in the law. 
b. Assumptions Regarding the Means of Information Acquisition 
Recall that Professor Kronman contends that, because it is inef-
ficient for courts to make case-by-case determinations of whether 
information is casually or deliberately acquired, courts instead lay 
down blanket rules about what class of case is most likely to in-
volve deliberately or casually acquired information. In contrast, we 
coded cases on an individual basis by analyzing the specific facts of 
each case. Accordingly, our study was not designed to test precisely 
Kronman’s hypothesis. 
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Nonetheless, coding in this manner allows us to test whether 
Professor Kronman was correct in his assumptions about how cer-
tain types of information are normally acquired. Recall, for exam-
ple, Kronman’s assertion that whether information is extrinsic or 
intrinsic appears to be relevant to court decisions only because ex-
trinsic information is typically deliberately acquired, and courts are 
concerned with protecting parties who have deliberately acquired 
their information.149 To test the claim that extrinsic information is 
typically deliberately acquired we performed simple counts. Of the 
14 cases in our dataset that involve extrinsic information, 8 (or 
57%) involve information that was casually acquired. Although 
this relies upon a very small sample size, this result contradicts 
Kronman’s characterization of the typical method of acquiring ex-
trinsic information. 
Similarly, Professor Kronman asserts that whether the transac-
tion concerned the transfer of real property appears to be relevant 
to courts only because information relevant to the transfer of real 
property is typically casually acquired, and courts are more likely 
to require the disclosure of casually acquired information. To test 
the claim that information relevant to the transfer of real property 
is typically casually acquired, we performed simple counts. Of the 
157 cases in our dataset that involve information concerning the 
transfer of real property, 124 (or 79%) involve casually acquired 
information. In this instance, Kronman’s hypothesis about the 
manner of information acquisition appears largely correct. 
Finally, Professor Kronman argues that whether a defect is la-
tent or patent appears to drive case outcomes only because infor-
mation concerning a latent defect is typically casually acquired, and 
courts require the disclosure of casually acquired information. To 
test the claim that information concerning a latent defect is typi-
cally acquired casually, we performed simple counts. Of the 60 
cases in our dataset that involve information concerning a latent 
defect, 54 (or 90%) involved casually acquired information. In this 
instance, again, Kronman’s prediction about the method by which 
such information is acquired seems accurate. 
Of course, these results do not take into account cases that are 
not ultimately decided by the court, and there is reason to believe 
 
149 See supra notes 65–67 and accompanying text. 
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that claims that settle or are never filed are different in important 
ways from claims that result in decisions. Without access to this in-
formation, we are not able to adequately evaluate Professor 
Kronman’s claims about the likely means of information acquisi-
tion in all cases. 
2. Whether the information was acquired through illegal or tortious 
means does not explain the variation in case outcomes because the 
number of cases involving such information is too small to obtain 
useful results from regression analysis. Outcome counts provide 
limited support for the hypothesis that courts are more likely to 
impose disclosure duties on contracting parties when the 
information is acquired through illegal or tortious means. 
We hypothesized that courts are more likely to hold that the in-
formed party owes the uninformed party a duty to disclose when 
the informed party acquires information using illegal or tortious 
means.150 The results presented in Table 4 demonstrate that the co-
efficient on ILLEGAL is insignificant (p > 0.10), indicating that 
this factor does not help to explain the variation in case outcomes. 
This result is most likely driven by the fact that only 1% of the 
cases in the full sample involve information of this sort. The num-
ber of these sorts of cases might be too small to accurately identify 
the effect of this variable on the likelihood of mandated disclosure. 
Nonetheless, simple outcome counts provide weak support for 
our hypothesis relating to the disclosure of illegally acquired in-
formation. Of the 4 cases in the sample involving information ac-
quired illegally or tortiously, 3 cases (or 75%) resulted in the impo-
sition of liability for fraudulent silence. The results of the outcome 
count thus provide some support for the claim that courts are more 
likely to impose a duty to disclose on the informed party when the 
withheld information is acquired illegally or tortiously, although 
the support is weak given that our sample includes a very small 
number of such cases. 
As with the other independent variables that appear in relatively 
few cases, a relevant question is why so few cases involving infor-
mation acquired by illegal or tortious means result in decisions. 
One possibility is that such cases settle early because the defendant 
 
150 See supra Section I.C.2. 
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is unsympathetic (having violated the law or committed a tort). 
Accordingly, such defendants might fear that courts will treat them 
more harshly, and would prefer to avoid the costs and potential 
bad publicity associated with litigation. If true, this fear regarding 
the impact of the informed party’s behavior on the case outcome is 
consistent with our findings regarding court decisions when the in-
formed party has engaged in other types of bad behavior, such as 
concealing information, lying, or telling a half-truth.151 
D. Characteristics of the Uninformed Party 
As discussed in Part I, we hypothesized that court decisions are 
influenced by particular characteristics of the uninformed party, in-
cluding whether the uninformed party is a buyer or lessee; is fe-
male; or is sick, disabled, illiterate, elderly, or otherwise severely 
disadvantaged in the bargaining relationship, although still compe-
tent to contract.152 
1. Courts are significantly more likely to require disclosure when the 
uninformed party is the buyer or lessee. 
We hypothesized that courts would be more likely to require 
disclosure when the uninformed party is the buyer or lessee, as op-
posed to the seller.153 The results presented in Table 4 support this 
claim. The coefficient on BUYER is positive and highly significant 
(p ≤ 0.01), even when we control for all variables relating to case 
characteristics. In this case, it appears that the commentators have 
argued correctly that courts impose higher disclosure duties on 
sellers than on purchasers. 
 
151 See infra Section III.E (discussing the impact of the informed party’s behavior on 
case outcomes). 
152 See supra Section I.D. 
153 See supra Section I.D.1. 
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2. Whether the uninformed party was female does not seem to be a 
factor that influences courts’ decisions regarding fraudulent silence. 
However, the percentage of cases in which the uninformed party is 
female and disclosure is required decreased significantly from the 
period 1793–1950 to the period 1951–2002.154 
As discussed in Part I, we hypothesized that a duty to disclose in-
formation is more likely to be found when the uninformed party is 
female, especially in older cases. The results presented in Table 4, 
however, indicate that the coefficient on FEMALE is insignificant 
(p > 0.10) in all specifications. These results suggest that courts are 
not significantly influenced by the gender of the uninformed party 
when determining the disclosure duties of bargaining parties. 
To test whether courts’ positions with respect to the level of dis-
closure required by the informed party when the uninformed party 
is female changed over time, we performed simple counts. Prior to 
1950, 24 cases involved an uninformed party who was female, and 
20 cases (or 83%) required disclosure. In contrast, in the period 
from 1950 to May 15, 2002, 31 cases involved an uninformed party 
who was female and 13 cases (or 42%) required disclosure. A test 
of the equality of proportions indicates that this difference is statis-
tically significant (p = 0.001). Although, when we control for all 
other variables relating to case characteristics, FEMALE does not 
seem to influence court decisions, we do find that in cases in which 
the uninformed party is female, courts were much more likely to 
require disclosure in cases decided prior to 1950 than in post-1950 
cases. 
 
154 We chose to divide the dataset into these time periods for specific reasons, includ-
ing that the split resulted in roughly equal sample sizes of cases involving uninformed 
females, and that public perceptions regarding the competence of women involved in 
commercial and business transactions may have begun to change during this post-
World War II era. 
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3. Courts are statistically significantly more likely to require 
disclosure when the uninformed party was sick, disabled, illiterate, 
or elderly, though competent to contract, although the statistical 
significance of the influence of this variable varies with the 
specification of the statistical model. 
As discussed in Part I, we hypothesized that courts express sym-
pathy for uninformed parties who are sick, disabled, illiterate or 
elderly, though still competent to contract, by being more likely to 
rule in their favor because of these factors.155 The results presented 
in Table 4 support this claim. The coefficient on SICK is positive 
and significant (p ≤ 0.10) in all specifications. Note, however, that 
the significance of the coefficient varies with the specification; in 
some cases the coefficient is statistically significant at only the 10% 
level (for example, Table 6 indicates a p-value of 0.06 when we 
control for all case characteristics, case decision year, geographic 
region and jurisdiction). Although the evidence is weak for some 
specifications of the empirical model, our intuition that when the 
uninformed party is sympathetic in these particular ways courts are 
more likely to require disclosure appears to have been correct. 
E. Behavior of the Informed Party 
As discussed in Part I, we hypothesized that courts consider the 
general behavior of the informed party when deciding the extent to 
which secret information must be disclosed to the uninformed 
party. Specifically, we predicted that when the informed party 
made affirmative misrepresentations or told half-truths in the same 
transaction in which the alleged omission occurred and when the 
informed party actively concealed information, courts are more 
likely to find a duty to disclose.156 
1. Courts are more likely to require disclosure if the court finds that 
the informed party made affirmative misrepresentations or told half-
truths in the same transaction in which the alleged omission 
occurred. 
In Part I, we predicted that courts’ decisions regarding whether 
material information must be revealed to the uninformed party are 
 
155 See supra Section I.D.3. 
156 See supra Section I.E. 
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influenced by the general behavior of the informed party.157 Spe-
cifically, if the informed party was found to have made an affirma-
tive misrepresentation or told a half-truth to the uninformed party 
in the same transaction in which the alleged omission occurred, we 
hypothesized that the court would be more likely to rule against 
the informed party in the separate fraudulent silence claim. The re-
sults presented in Table 4 support both of these claims. The coeffi-
cients on LIED and HALF-TRUTH are positive and highly sig-
nificant (p = 0.00). When we control for the case decision year, the 
geographic region, and the jurisdiction of the court, the coefficients 
remain positive and highly significant (p = 0.00). Therefore, the 
data provide strong support for the prediction that the general bad 
behavior of the informed party influences courts. 
2. A court is more likely to find a duty to disclose if it finds that the 
informed party actively concealed the withheld information. 
As discussed in Part I, we also hypothesized that another form of 
bad behavior on the part of the defendant—the active concealment 
of information—increases the probability that the court will re-
quire disclosure.158 The results presented in Table 4 support this 
claim. The coefficient on CONCEAL is positive and highly signifi-
cant (p = 0.00). When we control for the case decision year and the 
geographic region and jurisdiction of the court, the coefficient re-
mains positive and highly significant (p = 0.00). Therefore, the data 
provide strong support for the claim that actions taken by the in-
formed party to conceal information influence courts’ decisions re-
garding the imposition of disclosure duties. When taken together 
with the findings on LIED and HALF-TRUTH discussed in Sec-
tion III.E.1. above, the data strongly support the theory that courts 
account for the informed party’s behavior in determining whether 
a duty to disclose existed. 
F. Case Date 
Recall from Part I that many commentators argue that courts 
have become more pro-disclosure during the time period over 
 
157 See supra Section I.E.1. 
158 See supra Section I.E.2. 
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which our data span. In addition, some commentators make more 
specific claims about changes in the doctrine or application of the 
doctrine over time.159 In this Section we investigate these claims 
about trends over time and discuss some interesting patterns in the 
data revealed by our study. 
1. Basic regression analyses do not support the claim that courts 
have become more likely to require the disclosure of material 
information over time. 
Table 6 presents results from tests of the influence of the case 
decision date on the likelihood that the court will rule that the in-
formed party had a duty to disclose the withheld information to the 
uninformed party.160 
The results related to the general trend over time are striking. 
First, while most commentators claim that courts are more likely to 
require disclosure in more recent cases, results generated by the 
logistic regression analysis reported in Table 6 suggest that courts 
are less likely to mandate disclosure in recently decided cases. 
When we control for all twenty case characteristics, the coefficient 
on YEAR is negative and statistically significant (p = 0.01), indicat-
ing that, over time, courts have become less likely to find a duty to 
disclose. To test the robustness of this result, we added controls for 
geographic region and jurisdiction of the court.161 Although the co-
efficient loses some of its significance, it remains negative and 
weakly statistically significant (p = 0.08). 
Although these results provide support for the claim that courts 
have become less likely over time to require the disclosure of ma-
terial information, testing the claim using regression analysis does 
not allow us to determine whether this development progresses in 
 
159 See supra notes 96–97 and accompanying text. 
160 We also analyzed the data using probit analysis and obtained results that were 
nearly identical to the results we obtained using logistic regression analysis. 
161 Adding controls allows us to determine whether the relationship between year 
and the probability that the court imposes a duty to disclose suggested by the initial 
regression might be attributable to some other variable (for example, geographic re-
gion or jurisdiction) that possibly is correlated with year. For example, if a particular 
jurisdiction is less likely than other jurisdictions to find a duty to disclose and this ju-
risdiction produces a larger portion of reported case outcomes over time, then by con-
trolling for jurisdiction the regression is able to untangle the influences of jurisdiction 
and year of decision on the likelihood that the court will impose a disclosure duty. 
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a linear fashion or is more complicated, with spikes and valleys 
during particular time periods. To investigate this possibility, we 
employed more nuanced statistical tests and constructed time-
series graphs. 
2. Simple tabulation results do not support the claim that courts have 
been more likely to require disclosure in cases decided in later years. 
We employed simple tabulations, the results of which are re-
ported in Table 7, to check for differences between particular time 
periods using the entire sample. 
 
Table 7 
Tabulations for Cases over Various Periods 
 
PERIOD
COURT FOUND 
DUTY TO 
DISCLOSE
COURT FOUND NO 
DUTY TO 
DISCLOSE
1793–1860 10 (67%) 5 (33%)
1861–1940 89 (71%) 37 (29%)
1941–2002 138 (42%) 187 (58%)  
 
TABLE 7: This table presents the results of tabulations of the number of cases by outcome for 
three periods: 1793–1860, 1861–1940 and 1941–2002.  See supra note 99 and accompanying text. 
 
We found that, prior to 1860, courts found a duty to disclose in 
10 of 15 cases (or 67%). Between 1861 and 1940, the years roughly 
between the Civil War and the start of World War II, courts found 
a duty to disclose in 89 of 126 cases (or 71%). Finally, between 
1941 and 2002, courts found a duty to disclose in 138 of 325 cases 
(or 42%). A test for the equality of proportions calculated for the 
first two periods indicates that no statistically significant difference 
exists between the proportions (p = 0.62). The difference between 
the proportions calculated for the period 1861–1940 and 1941–
2002, however, is statistically significant (p = 0.00). These results do 
not support claims about an increase in the likelihood that courts 
will require disclosure due to the shift from an agrarian to a com-
mercial economy. In fact, the data indicates the opposite—courts 
have been less likely to require the disclosure of material informa-
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tion from World War II to the present than they were during the 
period from the Civil War until World War II. 
3. A time-series graph of the dependent variable does not support the 
claim that courts have been more likely over time to require 
informed parties to disclose information to uninformed parties, but 
reveals an interesting pattern when compared to a time series graph 
of the number of fraudulent silence decisions across time. 
To better understand the pattern of court decisions over time, 
we graphed the proportion of fraudulent silence cases in which the 
court found that the informed party owed the uninformed party a 
duty to disclose (see Figure 1). 
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Figure 1: Proportion of Cases in Which the Court  
Found a Duty to Disclose by Year 
 
The graph reveals that the proportion of cases in which the court 
imposed a duty of disclosure on the informed party decreased al-
most linearly over time, especially in the years after 1970—the 
years in which most of the cases in our dataset were decided. This 
observation further supports the findings obtained from the regres-
sion analyses. Given the pattern in the dependent variable over 
time revealed in Figure 1, it is unlikely that a non-linear relation-
2ND SUB_KRAWIECZEILERBOOK.DOC 11/17/2005  10:32:28 AM 
2005] Disclosure Duties and the Sin of Omission 1869 
ship between time and the probability of the court requiring disclo-
sure exists. 
It is also interesting to note that the number of decisions involv-
ing the issue of whether the informed party owed a duty of disclo-
sure significantly increased over time, again especially in the years 
after 1970. Figure 2 presents a graph of the number of fraudulent 
silence decisions by five-year periods.162 There are a small number 
of decisions during the five-year periods prior to 1900; therefore, 
we focus mainly on two trends in the data relating to the twentieth 
century. 
 
162 Recall that for the years prior to 1944, all relevant cases were included in the 
dataset, whereas, for 1944 and subsequent years, a random sample of the cases was 
included in the dataset. The vertical line drawn in Figure 2 divides these periods. For 
this reason, the increase in the number of decided cases after 1944 is actually under-
stated in Figure 2. 
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Recall that our dataset includes cases decided through May 15, 
2002. The striped bars represent projections for the period May 15, 
2002, through 2005. The vertical line separates cases decided prior 
to 1944, all of which are included in our dataset, from cases decided 
during or after 1944, a random sample of which is included in our 
dataset. 
By examining Figures 1 and 2 simultaneously, we find that, espe-
cially in the years subsequent to 1970, the courts become less likely 
to require disclosure, while, during the same period, a significantly 
increasing number of decisions appear in our dataset. On its face, 
this result seems counterintuitive. One might predict that, as the 
probability of winning at trial decreases, fewer uninformed parties 
will bring claims and more will settle prior to resolution by the 
court.163 
To explain this seemingly odd result, one would need informa-
tion on filing behavior, settlement rates, whether statutes impact 
the types of cases decided under common law, whether the issues 
on which judges choose to write opinions change over time, and 
how disclosure rules affect individual decisions about whether to 
disclose information. Accordingly, any conjectures made here 
about what is driving these patterns are simply that—conjectures. 
Nonetheless, one possibility is worth mentioning. Recall that the 
existence of a duty to disclose is only one element of a fraudulent 
silence case in which the plaintiff must prove other elements, such 
as scienter, reliance, and materiality, in order to prevail. If the in-
crease in the number of fraudulent silence decisions actually re-
flects an increase in the number of such claims that are brought 
and survive to litigation at the same time that the plaintiff’s prob-
ability of winning on the duty to disclose element is decreasing, 
then this could possibly reflect the fact that the plaintiff’s probabil-
ity of winning on one or more of the other elements of a fraudulent 
silence case (materiality, for example) is increasing at an even 
faster rate. Naturally, we are unable to test this conjecture using 
our data. Our study, however, raises the possibility that a similar 
 
163 We recognize the possibility that fewer cases are being filed and more cases make 
it to the decision stage as time goes on. Our data, however, do not allow us to investi-
gate the relationship between the probability of the court imposing a duty to disclose 
on the informed party and the number of cases decided per year. 
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study focusing on one or more of the other elements of a fraudu-
lent silence case would reveal interesting time trends as well. 
4. The time trend on the number of fraudulent silence decisions is in 
marked contrast to time trends on the number of decisions in 
contract cases generally. 
In a 2001 study of contract litigation, Professor Marc Galanter 
found that the volume of trials in contract cases increased until 
1990, followed by a substantial decline by about one-third, culmi-
nating in a period of little change from year to year.164 Our data on 
fraudulent silence decisions follow a markedly different pattern. 
Rather than decreasing during the period after 1990, Figure 2 indi-
cates that fraudulent silence decisions, although fluctuating some-
what, generally increased after 1990. 
Of course, several variables affect the number of decisions in 
contract cases, including decisions by informed parties regarding 
whether to disclose information during the contracting process, fil-
ing behavior, settlement behavior, and statutory developments. 
Because we lack information relating to those factors, we do not 
theorize about why fraudulent silence decisions do not follow gen-
eral trends of contract cases. Once again, however, these findings 
point to areas of potential research for those interested in patterns 
in contract and tort litigation. 
5. The data do not support specific claims made by commentators 
about trends over time. 
Some commentators make more specific claims about trends 
over time relating to the probability that courts will require the dis-
closure of material information. For example, recall from Part I 
that Professor Horwitz claims that, as the United States transi-
tioned from an agrarian to a commercial economy, courts became 
more likely to require the disclosure of information not available 
to both parties.165 To test this claim, we ran a logistic regression 
 
164 Marc Galanter, Contract in Court; or Almost Everything You May or May Not 
Want to Know About Contract Litigation, 2001 Wis. L. Rev. 577, 598 (2001) (report-
ing, for example, that 2507 contract trials were held in federal district court in 1988 
while 1517 trials were held in 1992, 1081 in 1996, and 902 in 1999). 
165 See supra note 97 and accompanying text. 
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controlling for the twenty case characteristics, the year the case was 
decided, and an interaction term (ACCESS * YEAR), to pick up 
the trend over time in cases involving unequal access. The coeffi-
cient on the interaction term is insignificant (p = 0.72), indicating 
no significant trend over time exists. Our data thus do not support 
Horwitz’s claim regarding changes in this area of the law due to 
changes in the economy. 
In addition, in a paper published in 1978, Professor Kronman 
claimed that disclosure duties relating to latent defects increased 
dramatically during the twenty-five-year period between approxi-
mately 1953 and 1978.166 To test this claim, we attempted to employ 
a logistic regression using the twenty variables related to case char-
acteristics. This regression failed to produce results because many 
of the variables are perfect predictors of disclosure and several of 
the variables are collinear. Therefore, we employed simple tabula-
tions to test the claim. We found that, prior to 1953, courts found a 
duty to disclose in 15 of the 16 cases (or 94%) involving latent de-
fects. In the twenty-five-year period between 1953 and 1978, 9 
cases involved latent defects and, of those 9 cases, the court found 
a duty to disclose in 8 (or 89%). A test for the equality of propor-
tions finds no statistically significant difference between the per-
centages (p = 0.65). Therefore, our data do not support Kronman’s 
claim about the development of the law relating to latent defects. 
G. Court 
1. Courts located in the Mid-Atlantic states and the Southwest are 
more likely to require disclosure than are courts located in other 
geographic regions. In addition, in contrast to the statements of some 
commentators, courts located in the South are not more likely to 
require disclosure, either during the period over which our data span 
or historically. 
We coded the cases for the geographic region in which the court 
sits to determine whether any geographic patterns emerged with 
respect to case outcomes.167 The basic regression results presented 
 
166 Kronman, supra note 1, at 23–24. 
167 States were assigned to geographic regions using the classification employed by 
the U.S. Embassy. See U.S. Diplomatic Mission to Germany, The Regions of the 
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in Table 6 indicate that courts located in the South, West, and 
Northeast are no more likely to impose liability for fraudulent si-
lence than are courts located in other regions.168 The results, how-
ever, do indicate that courts located in the Mid-Atlantic states and 
the Southwest are more likely to require disclosure than are courts 
located in other regions. 
As discussed in Part I, some commentators claim that southern 
states historically were much less likely to impose disclosure duties 
on bargaining parties than were states in other regions.169 To test 
this claim, we employed two strategies. First, we ran a logistic re-
gression controlling for the twenty case characteristics, the year the 
case was decided, and geographic regions (represented by 
SOUTH, WEST, MIDATLANTIC, SOUTHWEST, and 
NEWENGLAND with MIDWEST as the base) to test for regional 
differences over particular periods. The first regression, using data 
only from cases decided between 1793 and 1860, failed because 
several independent variables were perfect predictors of the likeli-
hood that the court would mandate disclosure.170 The second re-
gression used data only from cases decided between 1861 and 1940. 
The coefficient on the variable SOUTH is insignificant (p = 0.94), 
indicating no significant difference between cases decided in the 
South and other regions during this period of time. For the sake of 
completeness, we ran the same regression using only cases decided 
between 1941 and 2002. Again, the coefficient on SOUTH was not 
statistically significant (p = 0.92). 
Our second strategy involved calculating the proportion of cases 
in each region that imposed liability for two early periods: 1793–
1860 and 1860–1940. We also performed similar calculations for 
the period 1941–2002 for purposes of comparison. The tabulations 
 
United States, http://usa.usembassy.de/travel-regions.htm (last accessed Sept. 17, 
2005). 
168 We used the variable MIDWEST as the base to run the regressions. When we in-
clude MIDWEST in the model and use another region as the base, we find that the 
coefficient on MIDWEST is not significantly different from zero. Therefore, courts in 
the Midwest are no more or less likely to impose liability for fraudulent silence than 
courts in other regions. 
169 See supra note 98 and accompanying text. 
170 For example, in all cases involving personal intentions (PERSONAL) the court 
imposed a duty to disclose. The same was true for LATENT, INSURE, CONFID, 
ACCESS, PROPERTY, LIED, and INTRINSIC. 
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by outcome and by region for these three periods are presented in 
Table 8. 
 
Table 8 
Tabulations for Decisions by Outcome and by Region 
 
SOUTH WEST MIDATLANTIC SOUTHWEST NEW ENGLAND MIDWEST
Disclosure Duty Found 3 (75%) 0 6 (75%) 0 0 (0%) 1 (50%)
Disclosure Duty Not Found 1 (25%) 0 2 (25%) 0 1 (100%) 1 (50%)
SOUTH WEST MIDATLANTIC SOUTHWEST NEW ENGLAND MIDWEST
Disclosure Duty Found 19 (61%) 4 (40%) 29 (91%)*** 4 (67%) 5 (56%) 28 (74%)
Disclosure Duty Not Found 12 (39%) 6 (60%) 3 (9%) 2 (33%) 4 (44%) 10 (26%)
SOUTH WEST MIDATLANTIC SOUTHWEST NEW ENGLAND MIDWEST
Disclosure Duty Found 33 (41%) 34 (61%)** 23 (35%) 14 (47%) 10 (46%) 24 (34%)
Disclosure Duty Not Found 48 (59%) 22 (39%) 43 (65%) 16 (53%) 12 (54%) 46 (66%)
1793–1860
1861–1940
1941–2002
 
 
*   Significantly lower proportion of cases decided in the South as compared to this region, at the 
10% significance level (p < 0.10). 
** Significantly lower proportion of cases decided in the South as compared to this region, at the 
5% significance level (p < 0.05). 
*** Significantly lower proportion of cases decided in the South as compared to this region, at 
the 1% significance level (p < 0.01). 
 
TABLE 8: This table presents the results of tabulations of the number of decisions by outcome 
and by region for three periods: 1793–1860, 1861–1940 and 1941–2002. Two-sample, one-sized 
tests for the equality of proportions were performed to compare the proportion of decisions 
finding a duty to disclose and decided in the South to the proportion of decisions finding a duty 
to disclose and decided in another region. For each test, the null hypothesis of equal proportions 
was tested against the alternative hypothesis that the proportion of decisions finding a disclosure 
duty and decided in the South is significantly less than the proportion of decisions finding a dis-
closure duty and decided in another region. 
 
For the period 1793–1860, only fifteen cases are contained in the 
total sample, and only four of those were decided in the South. In 
three of the four cases, disclosure was required. This proportion is 
equal to the proportion of cases decided in the Mid-Atlantic states 
in which the court required disclosure. All other regions require 
disclosure in a smaller percentage of cases. Although the number 
of observations is very small, the data for this period support the 
claim that the South was less likely to impose a duty to disclose. 
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For the periods 1861–1940 and 1941–2002, tests for the equality 
of proportions were performed to compare the proportion of cases 
requiring disclosure and decided in the South to the proportion of 
cases requiring disclosure and decided in each of the other regions. 
Five separate tests (one for each region) were performed for each 
period. For each test, the null hypothesis of equal proportions was 
tested against an alternative hypothesis that the proportion of cases 
requiring disclosure and decided in the South is significantly less 
than the proportion of cases requiring disclosure and decided in 
the region of comparison. 
Only two of the ten tests indicate that the South is significantly 
less likely to require disclosure as compared to other geographic 
regions. First, during the period 1861–1940, courts in the South 
were less likely to require disclosure than were courts in the Mid-
Atlantic states. Second, during the period 1941–2002, courts in the 
South were less likely to require disclosure than were courts in the 
West. Otherwise, no statistically significant difference exists be-
tween the proportion of cases decided in the South finding a duty 
to disclose and the proportion of similarly decided cases in courts 
located in other regions finding a duty to disclose. Therefore, the 
data do not provide strong support for the claim that southern 
states historically were less likely to require disclosure as compared 
to other regions of the country. 
2. State courts are no more or less likely than federal courts to 
require the informed party to reveal information to the uninformed 
party. In addition, the Third Circuit, Sixth Circuit, and Seventh 
Circuit are more likely than any other circuit to require disclosure. 
As indicated in Part I, we were interested in determining 
whether courts differ by jurisdiction in terms of how likely they are 
to require disclosure. Specifically, we were interested in whether 
any differences existed between federal and state courts, or among 
the federal appellate circuits. 
The results presented in Table 6 indicate that the coefficient on 
STATE is significant and positive (p = 0.04) when we control only 
for variables relating to the 20 case characteristics. This provides 
some evidence for the claim that state courts are more likely than 
federal courts to impose duties to disclose. When we add controls 
for the case decision year, geographic regions, and federal appel-
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late circuit, however, the coefficient loses significance. This lack of 
robustness suggests that any difference between federal and state 
courts on this issue is weak at best. When all independent variables 
are included in the model, the coefficient on STATE becomes sta-
tistically insignificant (p = 0.28), indicating that state courts are no 
more or less likely to require disclosure than are federal courts. 
In addition, the results obtained from the regression analysis 
(see Table 6) indicate that three federal appellate jurisdictions are 
less likely to require disclosure than any other federal appellate ju-
risdiction: the Third Circuit (p = 0.08), the Sixth Circuit (p = 0.02), 
and the Seventh Circuit (p = 0.05). We cannot offer conjectures 
about why these particular circuits are less likely to impose a duty 
to disclose on informed parties but leave this task for other re-
searchers. One potentially interesting research question that arises 
from this finding is whether these results reflect broader trends in 
these circuits beyond fraudulent silence cases. 
H. A Note on Priest-Klein 
Courts found a duty to disclose in approximately 51% of the 
cases in the sample. This statistic is consistent with the Priest-Klein 
litigation model, which implies that, because only close cases are 
likely to proceed to litigation (with clear cases being settled or 
never brought at all), “the formal structure of the law [will] appear 
indeterminate to any scientific, empirical method of observing ju-
dicial decisions.”171 In other words, the model suggests that it is im-
possible to identify factors that significantly influence outcomes 
given that all litigated cases are perched on the knife-edge. In 
roughly half of the cases, they theorize, the outcome randomly falls 
to one side of the knife; in the other half, it randomly falls to the 
other side. 
For this reason, under the Priest-Klein model, our analysis is fu-
tile: if the model is truly predictive, then our analysis should fail to 
discover any significant drivers of outcomes. As this Part has re-
vealed, however, nearly half of our independent variables signifi-
cantly influence court decisions regarding whether the informed 
party had a duty to disclose information to the uninformed party. 
Therefore, we are left to explain these seemingly contradictory re-
 
171 See Priest & Klein, supra note 104, at 6. 
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sults (that is, the finding of statistically significant factors that seem 
to drive outcomes (contrary to the Priest-Klein predictions) despite 
the fact that the outcomes are nearly evenly divided (consistent 
with the Priest-Klein predictions)). 
One could claim that our results are simply spurious. Given the 
pattern of our results, however, we do not believe this is the case. 
For example, the factors found to significantly influence outcomes 
do not appear to be random. Instead, we find that many of the fac-
tors that significantly increase the probability that a court will im-
pose a duty to disclose are also the most widely-accepted, such as 
the factors listed in the Restatement of Contracts (that is, whether 
the parties are in a fiduciary or confidential relationship, whether 
the information is related to a latent defect, and whether the in-
formation would have updated or corrected previously disclosed 
information).172 
In addition, as a matter of theory, there are reasons to doubt that 
the Priest-Klein model holds when studying outcomes on the ele-
ment of the duty to disclose in fraudulent silence claims. In a 
fraudulent silence case, the imposition of a duty to disclose is only 
one element of a multi-element cause of action in which the plain-
tiff must also prove elements such as scienter, reliance, and materi-
ality. As a result, even when the plaintiff can easily show that the 
defendant had a duty to disclose, the case nonetheless might pro-
ceed to the litigation and opinion stage due to the parties’ uncer-
tainty about another element. As a result, cases in which the ele-
ment of duty is on the knife-edge are but a subset of the cases in 
our sample and, therefore, our regression analysis is able to iden-
tify factors that significantly influence outcomes on the duty ele-
ment. 
Given that our analysis focuses on just one element—duty—of a 
multi-element cause of action—fraudulent silence—one might 
question why we do not observe a larger majority of outcomes on 
the duty element favoring the plaintiff.173 It must be remembered, 
however, that plaintiffs may sometimes raise claims that they have 
a small probability of winning. This is true, for example, of suits in 
 
172 See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 161 (1979). 
173 One could argue that, if the duty element is not an element that is balanced on 
the knife-edge, then it must be an element on which the plaintiff is more likely to win. 
Otherwise, one might speculate that rational plaintiffs would not bring the case. 
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which plaintiffs have one or more relatively strong claims, but can 
allege other, weaker, claims based on the same fact pattern. Under 
such circumstances, the marginal cost of adding an additional weak 
claim to the suit is essentially zero.174 Under these circumstances, 
the plaintiffs’ success rate on the duty element could be less than 
50%. For these reasons, the fact that we observe 50% of the out-
comes on the duty element favoring the plaintiff might very well be 
anomalous and unrelated to the predictions of the Priest-Klein 
model. 
CONCLUSION 
The question of when an individual in possession of valuable in-
formation unknown to her contracting partner has the right to re-
main silent and profit from her secret knowledge has fascinated 
scholars in philosophy, law, and history since ancient times. Many 
have developed specific and general “meta-theories” to explain the 
variation in case outcomes. Few, however, have attempted to sys-
tematically analyze the cases, and none has employed regression 
analysis to isolate the effects of particular factors on case out-
comes. 
Our analysis calls into question much of the conventional wis-
dom regarding the law of fraudulent silence. In fact, our results fail 
to support several of the most prominent theories that have been 
asserted to explain when courts will require full disclosure between 
contracting parties. Specifically, our data do not support the con-
tentions that courts more frequently require the disclosure of in-
trinsic information than extrinsic information; that courts insist on 
the disclosure of information that could prevent bodily injury or 
property damage; that informed parties are able to freely withhold 
information regarding personal intentions or opinions; that those 
seeking insurance, surety, or a release from liability must disclose 
all relevant information; that courts more frequently require dis-
closure in transactions relating to the sale or transfer of real prop-
 
174 For example, consider cases in which the plaintiff’s strongest claim is that the de-
fendant affirmatively misrepresented a material fact. In cases such as these, the plain-
tiff might find that the marginal cost of adding even a weak claim to the suit alleging 
affirmative misrepresentation is essentially zero. In other words, if the facts giving rise 
to an affirmative misrepresentation claim also give rise to an albeit weak fraudulent 
silence claim, then the plaintiff might tack on the weak fraudulent silence claim. 
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erty; that courts tend not to require the disclosure of deliberately 
acquired information; that courts have become more likely to re-
quire disclosure over time; or that southern states are less likely to 
require disclosure than are states in other regions of the country. 
In some cases, however, the data do support conventional wis-
dom. In particular, the data support the hypotheses that courts are 
more likely to require the disclosure of latent, as opposed to pat-
ent, defects; that courts are more likely to require the disclosure of 
information that would update or correct previously disclosed in-
formation; that courts are more likely to require full disclosure be-
tween parties in a fiduciary or confidential relationship; that courts 
are more likely to require the disclosure of illegally or tortiously 
acquired information; and that courts are more likely to require 
disclosure when the uninformed party is a buyer or lessee. 
In addition, our own intuition that courts are swayed by the 
sympathetic nature of the uninformed party and the bad behavior 
of the informed party are supported by the data. Courts are signifi-
cantly more likely to require disclosure when the uninformed party 
is sick, disabled, illiterate, or elderly, though still competent to con-
tract. Also, courts are more likely to require disclosure when the 
informed party lied or told half-truths in the same transaction in 
which the omission occurred, or when the informed party took af-
firmative steps to conceal the withheld information. Our suspicion, 
however, that courts are more likely to require disclosure when the 
uninformed party is female is not supported by the data, although 
our data did reveal a time trend in fraudulent silence decisions 
when the uninformed party is female. The percentage of cases in 
which the uninformed party is female and the court required dis-
closure decreased significantly from the period 1793–1950 to the 
period 1951–2002. 
Perhaps most importantly, our analysis suggests that the long-
standing and heated debate between those who argue that courts 
attempt primarily to enhance fairness by placing contracting par-
ties on a more even playing field and those who argue that courts 
attempt primarily to enhance economic efficiency by allowing in-
formed parties to reap the benefit of knowledge that is deliberately 
acquired could be misplaced. Our data provide little, if any, sup-
port for the contention that courts are more likely to require the 
disclosure of casually, as compared to deliberately, acquired infor-
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mation. Regression results do indicate that courts are more likely 
to require the disclosure of information when the parties lack equal 
access. Our analysis, however, reveals that it is the presence of un-
equal access in combination with casually acquired information 
that drives case outcomes. Therefore, it is the presence of these 
two factors together, rather than either one independently, that 
significantly affects case outcomes. 
We view this study merely as a first step toward unraveling a dif-
ficult and controversial area of law, rather than a definitive answer 
to the question of what drives outcomes in fraudulent silence cases. 
Although this study provides some answers, it raises many ques-
tions as well. 
For example, although our data show that, contrary to conven-
tional wisdom, courts have become less likely over time to require 
the disclosure of material information unknown to one’s bargain-
ing partner, does this mean that courts have become more pro-
defendant over time? Or have other factors, such as the codifica-
tion of certain areas of fraudulent silence law through statutes that 
mandate particular disclosures, altered the type of case that sur-
vives to litigation under the common law?175 The answers to these 
questions, and others, however, are beyond the scope of this Arti-
cle. 
In addition, regression analyses on data spanning a two-
hundred-year period do not permit us to capture the law at any 
particular point in time. Alternative strategies (such as, for exam-
ple, using regression analysis over moving windows of smaller time 
periods) allow such an analysis, however. Not only would this 
strategy more fully highlight any time trends in the data, but also it 
would permit testing for whether particular events or develop-
ments of note, such as, for example, the publication of the Re-
statement (Second) of Contracts, actually produced changes in the 
 
175 Common examples are statutes mandating certain disclosures in residential real 
estate transactions and car sales. Because such statutes are generally pro-plaintiff, if 
these statutes merely codify changes that were already occurring under the common 
law, then the cases remaining to be decided under the common law could conceivably 
be those in areas of the law in which courts were not expanding disclosure duties. As a 
result, these cases would appear to reflect a pro-defendant trend that does not really 
exist. 
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law (as has been asserted by some commentators), rather than 
simply restated the law.176 
 
 
176 G. Edward White, The American Law Institute and the Triumph of Modernist 
Jurisprudence, 15 Law & Hist. Rev. 1, 46 (1997) (discussing the debate over whether 
the ALI only restates the law or attempts to revise it); Herbert P. Wilkins, Foreword 
to the Symposium on the American Law Institute: Process, Partisanship, and the Re-
statements of Law, 26 Hofstra L. Rev. 567, 569 (1998) (stating that some argue that 
the ALI often attempts to push the law in a particular direction, as opposed to simply 
restating the law). 
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APPENDIX A 
This appendix describes the data collection process undertaken 
for Common-Law Disclosure Duties and the Sin of Omission: Test-
ing the Meta-Theories. The purpose of this appendix is to provide 
details regarding the population of cases from which we drew our 
sample and our case coding procedures. 
1. The Population of Cases From Which We Drew Our Sample 
The Allcases-old database includes documents from the United 
States Supreme Court, courts of appeals, district courts, former cir-
cuit courts, former Court of Claims, “related federal courts” (such 
as the tax and customs courts), and state and local courts.1 The fed-
eral documents included in the database are those opinions “re-
leased for publication” between 1789 and 1944. State and local 
coverage begins on various dates and extends through 1944.2
It is unclear from West’s website whether “released for publica-
tion” refers only to documents officially released for publication or 
whether it also includes unpublished opinions that might have be-
come available. Neither West’s reference attorneys nor any other 
company representative was able to clarify this point.3 Because the 
practice (at least within the federal appellate courts) of disposing 
of cases through unpublished opinions is assumed by most com-
mentators to have begun in 1964, however, the issue of unpub-
lished opinions is likely a greater problem in the Allcases database 
than in the Allcases-old database.4
The Allcases database includes decisions dated after 1944 from 
the United States Supreme Court, courts of appeals, district courts, 
bankruptcy courts, the Court of Federal Claims, the United States 
Tax Court, the Military Courts, and the state and local courts of all 
1 Westlaw, Westlaw Database Directory, http://directory.westlaw.com/scope/ 
default.asp?db=ALLCASES-OLD&RS=WDIR2.0&VR=2.0 (last accessed Sept. 17, 
2005). 
2 Id. 
3 Telephone Interview with Reference Attorney, West, in Eagan, Minn. (Aug. 4, 
2002). 
4 See infra note 15 and accompanying text (discussing the origination of the federal 
appellate non-publication and no-citation policies). 
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the states and the District of Columbia.5 The Allcases database in-
cludes published as well as some unpublished opinions.6
Like many other studies attempting to empirically examine case 
law or judicial developments, this study is limited to the Westlaw 
database, which does not include all decided cases. Instead, West-
law excludes some unpublished cases, thus biasing the results to the 
extent that there is some systematic difference between available 
and unavailable cases. 
According to a Westlaw representative, West gathers unpub-
lished opinions for inclusion in the Allcases database from three 
sources: (1) the Federal Appendix, a West publication; (2) opinions 
submitted to Westlaw for posting in the database directly by the 
deciding court; and (3) opinions submitted to Westlaw by attor-
neys.7 The Federal Appendix does not contain all unpublished opin-
ions. Specifically, the Third, Fifth and Eleventh Circuits do not 
permit publication of their unpublished opinions in the Appendix.8 
In addition, the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits do not release their 
unpublished opinions for inclusion in the Westlaw or Lexis data-
bases.9
Finally, West does not include in the Allcases database all un-
published opinions submitted for inclusion by attorneys. Instead, 
West reviews the submitted cases and selects “some” for inclusion. 
No Westlaw representative was able to provide further information 
on the selection process, what criteria were used to determine in-
clusion, or indicate what percentage of cases submitted for inclu-
sion by attorneys was ultimately included in the database.10
5 Westlaw, Westlaw Database Directory, http://directory.westlaw.com/scope/ 
default.asp?db=ALLCASES&RS=WDIR2.0&VR=2.0 (last visited Sept. 17, 2005). 
6 Id. An “unpublished” opinion is one which the court has determined should be ex-
cluded from the official reporter, ostensibly because the case contains no precedential 
value. Cf. Melissa M. Serfass & Jessie L. Cranford, Federal and State Court Rules 
Governing Publication and Citation of Opinions, 3 J. App. Prac. & Process 251 (2001) 
(outlining the guidelines for opinion publication and citation in each federal and state 
court of appeal). 
7 Telephone Interview with Reference Attorney, West, in Eagan, Minn. (Aug. 4, 
2002). 
8 Brian P. Brooks, Publishing Unpublished Opinions, 5 Green Bag 259, 260 (2002). 
9 See David Greenwald & Frederick A.O. Schwarz, Jr., The Censorial Judiciary, 35 
U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1133, 1150 n.64 (2002). 
10 Telephone Interview with Reference Attorney, West, in Eagan, Minn. (Aug. 4, 
2002). 
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West’s failure to include all decided cases in the on-line database 
could significantly impact our results. Specifically, the unpublished 
federal appellate decisions seem more likely to be included on 
Lexis and Westlaw than are unpublished state court decisions. For 
this reason, if there is some systematic difference between federal 
appellate court decisions and state court decisions, this differential 
inclusion in the Westlaw database could affect the results of this or 
any other study relying on the Westlaw database. Similarly, be-
cause the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits do not release their unpub-
lished opinions for inclusion on Westlaw or Lexis, if there is some 
systematic difference between the Fifth and Eleventh circuits on 
the one hand, and the other eleven circuits on the other hand, this 
difference might bias the results of this and any other study that 
employs the Westlaw database. 
Given that, in the federal appeals courts alone, over eighty per-
cent of the caseload is disposed of through unpublished opinions, 
this is a potentially glaring omission.11 Although federal unpub-
lished opinions have no precedential value in most jurisdictions,12 
many commentators argue that unpublished opinions, nonetheless, 
are important.13 Accordingly, readers should at least be aware of 
the potential limits of this or any other study based on the on-line 
databases.14
11 2001 Admin. Off. of the U.S. Courts Ann. Rep. of the Director Table S–3, at 40, 
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2001/tables/s03sep01.pdf.  
12 Currently, only the Fourth, Sixth and D.C. Circuits permit the citation of unpub-
lished opinions as precedent. See 4th Cir. R. 36(c) (laying out the 4th Circuit’s rule); 
6th Cir. R. 28(g) (laying out the 6th Circuit’s rule); D.C. Cir. R. 28(c) (laying out the 
DC Circuit’s rule). The rules regarding the precedential value of unpublished opin-
ions are contained in the court rules for each circuit. For a discussion of the rules, see 
Jason B. Binimow, Annotation, Precedential Effect of Unpublished Opinions, 105 
A.L.R.5th 499 (2005); David Vladeck & Mitu Gulati, Judicial Triage: Reflections on 
the Debate Over Unpublished Opinions, 62 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. (forthcoming Fall 
2006).  
13 See, e.g., Suzanne O. Snowden, “That’s My Holding and I’m Not Sticking to It!” 
Court Rules That Deprive Unpublished Opinions of Precedential Authority Distort 
the Common Law, 79 Wash. U. L.Q. 1253, 1257 (2001) (arguing that unpublished 
opinions often would have had important future precedential value if they had been 
published).
14 For a general discussion on the limitations of empirical studies of case outcomes, 
see Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study, 76 Cor-
nell L. Rev. 1036, 1045–47 (1991). 
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Although the problem of officially unpublished cases does not 
likely affect the Allcases-old database—the practice is generally as-
sumed to have begun with the 1964 Federal Judicial Conference15—
surveys of older American case law suffer from an even greater 
problem: the lack of case reporting during the early years of 
American independence. In the early years of the history of the 
American courts, lack of reporting of decided cases was a serious 
problem.16 Lawyers had to make do with reports of English cases, 
which were still widely used even after American independence, 
and notebooks of decisions that lawyers maintained for their own 
use and use by their colleagues and friends.17
Even opinions of the United States Supreme Court were difficult 
to obtain in the early years. The Court often failed to reduce even 
its most important decisions to writing;18 the reporters did not in-
clude all decisions in their reports, perhaps excluding, in some 
cases, as many as half;19 reports were often unavailable for periods 
of up to eight years after the end of the Supreme Court term;20 and 
the reports of some reporters, at least, were heavily criticized, even 
by their contemporaries and the justices themselves, as being inac-
15 See, e.g., Greenwald & Schwartz, supra note 9, at 1141; Deborah Jones Merritt & 
James J. Brudney, Stalking Secret Law: What Predicts Publication in the United 
States Courts of Appeals, 54 Vand. L. Rev. 71, 75–76 (2001). 
16 See 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) iii–v (1804) (“Much of that uncertainty of the law, which is 
so frequently, and perhaps so justly, the subject of complaint in this country, may be 
attributed to the want of American reports.”), quoted in Craig Joyce, The Rise of the 
Supreme Court Reporter: An Institutional Perspective on Marshall Court Ascen-
dancy, 83 Mich. L. Rev. 1291, 1308 (1985) (discussing the problem of nonreporting of 
cases in the early years of the American court system). 
17 Id. at 1297; see also Erwin C. Surrency, Law Reports in the United States, 25 Am. 
J. Legal Hist. 48, 49 (1981) (discussing the prevalence of English law reports in eight-
eenth-century estates). 
18 Joyce, supra note 16, at 1298 n.46, 1304 n.77 (quoting a telephone conversation 
with Maeva Marcus, Coeditor of the Documentary History Project, where she states, 
“It seems odd that if opinions were written, not a single one in the hand of a justice 
survives. So it is likely that few, if any, ever existed.”). 
19 Id. at 1303 (discussing the incompleteness of the reports of Alexander James Dal-
las, the Court’s first—though unofficial—reporter); id at 1329–30 (discussing the 
omission of cases by Henry Wheaton, the Court’s third—and first official—reporter). 
20 Id. at 1327–28 (noting that Dallas and William Cranch, the Court’s second—
though unofficial—reporter, had allowed Supreme Court cases to go unreported for 
eight and six years, respectively). These delays were corrected by Wheaton, who gen-
erally published the reports of the prior term in time for the start of the next. Id. 
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curate.21 One can only assume that reports of state and lower fed-
eral cases suffered from similar problems. 
Readers thus should bear in mind that our only historical record 
of early court decisions might be substantially inaccurate. Again, 
this is an unavoidable failing of all studies of early case law, and we 
do not feel that it renders our results any less important or robust. 
2. Case-Coding Procedures 
Case coding was done by research assistants, with the supervi-
sion of one of the authors. Weekly meetings were held as a group 
in order to assess progress, discuss the cases, and answer questions. 
Steps were taken to enhance the consistency of coding by the dif-
ferent research assistants. These steps include the adoption of 
bright-line rules, where possible, and several weeks of individually 
coding the same set of cases and discussing them as a group. Once 
the group was able to consistently reach the same coding results, 
coding on the project began. In addition, once the initial case cod-
ing was complete, all of the coding was double-checked by a re-
search assistant who had not been involved in the initial coding 
project. The reliability test resulted in a match of roughly 90% of 
the data coded by the original coders. 
Not all cases retrieved by the search terms were includable in the 
study. For example, a small percentage of cases contained all of the 
specified search terms, yet did not address the question being stud-
ied. In addition, we were unable to code some cases, either because 
the court did not reach a decision on the merits of the case, or be-
cause the opinion did not contain sufficient information to allow 
for complete coding of all the independent variables. When the 
case included in our sample was an appeal from a lower court deci-
sion and that lower decision was available on Westlaw, the re-
search assistants sometimes referred to the lower court decision to 
21 Id. at 1304–05 (discussing the inaccuracy of Dallas’s reports), 1309–10 (discussing 
inaccuracies in the reports of Cranch), 1361 (discussing criticisms of the reports of 
Richard Peters, Jr., the Court’s fourth reporter). The problem of inaccuracy probably 
stemmed from many causes, including commercial considerations and the fact that 
some reporters (notably, Dallas) included reports of cases of which they did not have 
first-hand knowledge, but instead which were reconstructed from the notes of attor-
neys in attendance. Id. at 1305. One exception to these criticisms of inaccuracy ap-
pears to be Wheaton, who reportedly was “fanatical” on this point. Id. at 1329–30. 
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ascertain the complete facts necessary to code the case. In rare 
cases, a court did not reach a decision on the merits of the case, but 
nonetheless clearly indicated how it would have ruled if forced to 
decide the case. Such cases were included in our dataset, despite 
the lack of a formal resolution to the dispute. 
Cases in which the common law had been altered due to a 
waiver, warranty, or statute were excluded from the dataset. For 
example, a waiver might alter the common law by waiving the un-
informed party’s rights to sue for nondisclosure under common 
law. This would include items sold “as is.” Similarly, a warranty 
might enhance the uninformed party’s status under the common 
law by guaranteeing the value or suitability of the item in question. 
Finally, the research assistants checked all the cases in our data-
set for negative direct history. If a lower court’s fraudulent silence 
decision was reversed and remanded specifically on the element of 
the existence of a duty to disclose, then the lower court case was 
excluded from our dataset. The appellate decision also was ex-
cluded unless the appellate court reached a decision on the merits 
of the duty element. If, however, a lower court case was overturned 
for procedural reasons or on a point of law unrelated to the duty to 
disclose issue, then the lower court case was included in our data-
set, despite the fact that the holding technically no longer stands. 
 
